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EXCHANGE RATE
Amnual Average End Period
1989 1990 1991 July 1992
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MERCHANDISE EXPORTS (AVERAGE 1989-1991)
US$ Mtn X
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Electrical & Electronics 18326 27.6
Passenger Cars 2007 3.0
Ships 2906 4.4
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DEBT SERVICE RATIO (1990) 10.7 X
IBRD/IDA LENDING (6/30/92)
(millions of USS) IBRD IDA
Outstanding & Disbursed 6950.0 119.6
Undisbursed 673.9 0.0
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............................................................................................................
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KOREA
COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM
A. Introduct3on and Overview
1.1 Despite the recent symptoms of "growing pains' in the process of
transition to maturity, the Korean economy continues to prosper. Less cannot
be said about an economy that has grown at an average rate of 10 percent
during the last five years, seen per capita income rise by four thousand
dollars to a level of $6,500 in current dollars, and become the world's 12th
largest trading nation in the process. However, this is not to say that such
prosperity has come smoothly and without cost. Korea has experienced
wrenching labor strife in recent years and presently suffers from a case of
"overheating". It also faces challenges in the areas of labor, trade,
finance, technology and social welfare. The fundamentals, however, remain
robust and on this basis Korea should continue to prosper over the medium
term.
1.2 One prominent characteristic of recent macroeconomic developments
is overheated domestic demand. Evidence for this may be found in the
following fa&:ts: First, the economy is experiencing labor shortage. Second,
inflation has been accelerating in the last two years. The causes of
overheating lie mostly in high private consumption and construction
investment. During 1989-91, private consumption has risen faster than GNP, at
an average rate of 10 percent (compared with 8 percent GNP growth), thanks in
part to hefty wage increases and substantial capital gains in real estate.
Construction investment has exploded, at an average rate of 20 percent, due
mostly to the ambitious project of building two million housing units.
1.3 Korea is concerned that the recent 'excessive" private consumption
may have been undermining growth potential by depleting capital for eqtipment
investment. Although it may well be a legitimate concern, it should also be
understood that the surge in private consumption is a common transitional
phenomenon when per capita income reaches a certain threshold level, as the
public tries to catch up the previously repressed consumption. The explosion
in construction investment similarly reflected a catch-up process in the
provision of housing, which has lagged behind the developments in other social
welfare areas. All in all, considering the robust equipment investment level,
it would be fair to say that the recent high private consumption and
construction investment have not crowded out equipment investment much.
1.4 Another prominent characteristic is difficulties in the labor
market. Although the frequency of labor disputes declined sharply since 1990,
nominal wages in manufacturing continued to increase rapidly, at an average
rate of 20 percent during 1989-91. The rapid wage increases reflected the
tight labor market, as evidenced by the unemployment rate of 2.3 percent. In
turn, labor productivity in manufacturing increased by an average of 11
percent. Alarmed by the recent trend of wage increases, the government has
intervened in the wage settlement process since 1990, mainly through wage
guidelines, but with little success, in part due to the complex wage payment
system involving various allowances and bonuses in addition to basic pay.
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1.5 Emerging labor shortage is another concern in the labor market.
This affects the small and medium manufacturing sector especially and is due
in part to the overheated domestic demand and in part to ongoing structural
changes in the supply side of the labor market. There are three major reasons
for the changes in the supply side. First, successful family planning and
changing family size preferences have reduced the population growth rate.
Second, the pool of young rural workers from which industry had drawn
liberally in the 1960s and 1970s has -_Irtually dried up. Third, the expansion
of secondary education has reduced thi: supply of workers even from within the
urban population. The government intends to mobilize more female, older and
handicapped labor as part-time workers by revising labor laws and increasing
nurseries, among others. The government is reluctant to rapidly increase
guest workers, fearing a possible adverse social impact.
1.6 Exports grew at an average rate of only 3 percent during 1989-91,
in sharp contrast to the average of 20 percent during 1986-88. (Thus, the
primary source of economic growth since 1989 has been domestic demand rather
than the external sector.) The recent lackluster performance in exports has
been due in part to external factors such as the sluggish world economy, but
mostly to an erosion of export competitiveness. Among the factors responsible
for an erosion of competitiveness, difficulties in the labor market and in
technology upgrading are most serious. On the other hand, imports continued
to surge due to a rapid increase in domestic demand. As a result, the current
account balance has steadily worsened since 1989, after a period of expanding
surpluses during 1986-88, and eventually turned to deficits of $2 billion in
1990 and $9 billion in 1991. Accordingly, the amount of external debt, which
had rapidly declined from the peak of $47 billion in 1985 to $33 billion in
1989, increased to $39 billion by the end of 1991.
1.7 Although Korea has made significant progress in trade
liberalization, which was accelerated during 1987-88 in the wake of large
trade surpluses and ensuing pressures from trading partners, elimination of
restrictions on agricultural imports has been slower than some trading
partners would have liked. The Korean government aims to speed up the
liberalization of agricultural imports, which will demand considerable efforts
to mitigate the substantial adjustments required in the agricultural sector.
Another main area of negotiations for liberalization has been the services
market. Efforts have been made to place foreign and domestic banks closer to
an equal footing. Liberalization measures were also undertaken in the areas
of securities, life insurance, advertising, wholesale and retailing, and
travel services.
1.8 During the 1980s, the authorities have made several attempts to
liberalize the domestic financial sector, but with limited success. Most
recently, in December 1988, the authorities attempted to implement gradual
interest rate deregulation, but postponed implementation due to unfavorable
macroeconomic developments. In August 1991, the government announced a new
four-phase interest deregulation schedule. According to the plan, lending
rates are to be deregulated faster than deposit rates. The first phase took
effect in November 1991 and was comp:eted in June 1992. So far, about 10
percent of the lending rates have been deregulated. Further financial market
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liberalization, if effectively and prudently implemented, will help strengthen
the industrial sector and foster industrial transformation.
1.9 The Korean government has also successfully pursued a gradual
capital market internationalization program since the early 1980s. Among
others, indirect investment in Korean stocks has been allowed through foreign
investment funds, such as the Korea Fund and Korea-Europe Fund. Starting
January 1992, foreigners were allowed to invest directly in Korean stocks with
certain limits. Portfolio investment by foreigners has been smooth and steady
so far. While the government is committed to financial market deregulation in
principle, the actual speed of implementation will depend on macroeconomic
conditions over the next several years.
1.10 The Korean economy has been undergoing significant industrial
restructuring, one distinctive trend being the declining light industry. The
share of light industry in total manufacturing production decreased to an
average of 38 percent during 1988-91, 5 percentage points lower than the
average during 1985-87. The recent high wage increases not accompanied by the
corresponding productivity increases, in combination with frequent labor
disputes, accelerated the industrial transformatiorn away from the labor-
intensive light industry. Although the recent trend is not totally negative
since it could facilitate the industrial restructuring, away from the less
efficient industries and towards the higher value-added industries, efforts
should be made to help tbe transformation be smoother, such as strengthening
the sor!ial safety net for the workers in the declining labor-intensive
industries.
1.11 Enhancing productivity will be the key for the successful
industrial restructuring. In this regard, one crucial element is technology
development. Korea made significant progress in promoting technology
development during the 1980s, as indicated by the fact that Korea's R&D
expenditure as a proportion of GNP tripled from 0.6 percent to 1.9 percent,
which is higher than, for example, the R&D ratio in Taiwan, China.
Nonetheless, Korean firms are concerned about slow domestic technology
development. They also complain that industrialized countries have become
more reluctant to transfer technology. Accordingly, the Korean government has
identified technology development as one of the top priorities in the Seventh
Five-Year Plan and aims to boost the R&D expenditure to GNP ratio up to an
ambitious 3-4 percent (which is higher than the current level of the U.S. or
Japan) by 1996.
1.12 Significant progress has been made in improving social welfare
during the 1980s, especially in the areas of health insurance and housing.
However, although poverty has decreased substantially in the process of rapid
economic growth, it is argued that a sense of "relative deprivation' among
lower and middle income classes has grown. It is widely perceived that the
distribution of wealth, if not income, is considerably skewed, due mainly to
the highly concentrated land ownership.
1.13 An interesting recent development is the improvement of relations
between North and South Korea, which raises the prospect of economic
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cooperation and perhaps even economic Integration in the foreseeaDle future.
This would have significant implications for the economic development of the
Korean peninsula. The two economies are complemer.tary in many respects and
the combination of the capital and manageLial and technological expertise cf
the South with the labor and natural resources of the North could possibly
produce one of the strongest economies within decades. Of course, there are
likely to be adjustment costs as well, especially arising from the need to
dismantle the North's inefficient heavy ind.stry sector. In any case, the
path to greater cooperation and integration is strewn with politimcal obstacles
and recent movements have been erratic, with progress and optimism followed by
occasional reversals and pessimism.
1.14 Concerned with the overheating of the economy, the government
decided to implement contractionary policies in 1992. It aims at sacrificing
the GNP growth in return for lower inflation and a smaller trade deficit.
Fiscal and monetary austerity will be the key for the success of this policy
option. An alternative policy option to ease overheating would be
accelerating the pac? of capital account liberalization, hence allowing
foreign capital inflows and appreciation of the won. With this approach,
Korea could narrow the investment-savings gap and lessen the inflationary
pressure. In fact, experiences of Japan and Taiwan, China since the mid-1980s
showed that the appreciation has effectively contributed co the successful
industrial restructuring. This approach would have negative aspects, however.
For one, if combined with high wage increases, it would seriously damage the
competitiveness of labor-intensive small and medium industries. For another,
it would depress exports and result in an increase in external debt. Domestic
demand development in the first half of 1992 has shown signs of cooling off,
especially in construction investment.
1.15 Korea's medium-term development targets are outlined in the Seventh
Fi-ve-Yea- Plan. According to the Plan, GNP growth is targeted at an annual
ro.te of 7.5 percent, and by 1996 per capita GNP is projected to reach above
$10,000. It is generally believed that the Korean economy will not have
serious difficulties in achieving the macroeconomic targets per se, barring
major external shocks. Rather, the real challenge is whether Korea will be
able to join the ranks of industrialized countries by the end of this century,
as the Korean government envisages. This will depend on how successfully
Korea can resolve a number of problems of which the most significant ares (i)
how to establish harmonious labor-management relation and resolve the labor
shortage problem, (ii) how to further liberalize the economy, especially in
the agricultural sector and the financial sector (iii) how to accommodate the
industrial restructuring smoothly, (iv) how .o enhance equity without
undermining growth potential; and (v) how 4'J balance continued growth with
avoidance of environmental degradation.
B. Output and Demand Developments
1.16 After a major economic boom during the 1986-88 period, with over 12
percent GNP growth in each of these years, GNP growth rates decelerated to 6.8
percent in 1989 and then rebounded to 9.3 percent in 1990 and 8.4 percent in
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1991. (See Table 1.1.) The drop in GNP growth rates since 1989 was chiefly a
reault of sluggish export growth. WhiLe strong exp3rt performance, which
benefitted from low oil prices, low interest rates, and a depreciating won,
mainly contributed to the 1986-88 boom, the major source of economic growth
since 1989 has been domestic demand rather than the external sector.
1.17 Net Exnorta. Korean exports over the past three years nave
increased very modestly, compared with an average of 20 percent export growth
during 1986-88. Exports decreased by 3.8 percent in 1989, ane slightly
increased by 4.2 percent in 1990, and picked up to 9.8 percent in 1991.
Imports continued to surge at an average rate of 16.0 percent during 1989-91,
which is similar to the average import growth rate during 1986-88. As a
result, the trade balance continued to deteriorate from surpluses of $11.5
billion in 1988 and $4.6 billion in 1989 to deficits of $2.0 billion in 1990
and $7.1 billioni n 1991. The trdde balance during the first half f 1992
showed a slight improvement, registering a deficit of $2.9 billion.
1.18 The lackluster export performance has been mainly due to the
following factorst (i) substantial wage increases in addition to labor
shortages and the decline in work discipline in the midst of frequent labor
disputes, (ii) difficulties in technology upgrading; and (iii) lagged effect
of a sharp appreciation of the won. (The issues of export competitiveness are
discussed in detail in paras 1.54-1.58.) In sum, while Korea has been losing
competitiveness in the traditional abor-intensive export items to countries
like China, it has not yet climbed up to the next rung of the technology
ladder to compete in more advanced items with countries like Japan. In turn,
the continued surge in imports has been due to the rapid growth of domestic
demand.
1.19 Domestic Demand. Tne macroeconomic situation since 1989 has been
characterized by overheated omestic demand. In contrast to the previous
years, private consumption grew faster than GNP, at an average rate of more
than 10 percent during 1989-91 (i.e., 1.5 percentage points higher than in the
period of rapid GNP growth during 1986-88), reflecting large wage increases
and capital gains from real estate. Construction investment increased rapidly
at an average rate of almost 20 percent during 1989-91, 8 percentage points
higher than in the period of 1986-88, as a result of the ambitious
construction project of two million housing units scheduled for 1988-92,
although it cooled down substantially slnce the second half of 1991 due to the
government's trict regulation on commercial building construction. Equipment
investment growth remained high at an average rate of more than 15 percent
over the last three years, compared with 19 percent during 1986-88, as
investment in new product developmc., R&D, and automation increased rapidly.
Consequently, the gross savings rat_oj fell below the gross investment ratio by
1.1 percent of GNP in 1990 and even further by 3.2 percent in 1991, a sharp
turnaround from 1987-89 when the gross savings ratio exceeded the gross
investment ratio.
1.20 There is a concern that the recent private consumption expenditure
has been "excessive". Hcwever, it should be understood that the rapid
increase in private consumption is a common transitional phenomenon observed
in other NICs when per capita inLome reaches a certain threshold level as the
-6-
Table 1.1: GNP by Y'xpenditure and by Industry
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a/
(Rate of change, 1985 constant
prices)
Consumption 8.1 9.7 10.7 10.1 9.2
Private consumption 8.3 9.8 10.9 10.3 9.2
Public consumption 6.9 9.4 9.7 8.9 9.2
CGross domestic investment 17.7 15.2 20.9 18.3 16.0
Fixed investment 16.5 13.4 16.9 24.0 11.9
Of whichs
Equipment investment 19.4 13.0 15.2 18.4 12.8
Construction investment 14.0 18.5 18.5 29.1 11.2
Exports of goods and services 21.6 12.5 -3.8 4.2 9.8
Imports of goods and services 19.4 12.8 16.3 14.4 17.4
GDP 12.0 11.5 6.2 9.2 8.4
GNP 13.0 12.4 6.8 9.3 8.4
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing -6.8 8.0 -1.1 -5.1 -0.8
Manufacturing 18.8 13.4 3.7 9.1 8.5
Construction 12.7 9.5 16.1 23.7 11.3
Services 14.0 12.8 8.3 10.1 10.6
(2 of GNP,
current prices)
Gross savings 36.8 38.6 35.4 36.1 36.2
Gross investment 30.1 31.1 33.6 37.2 39.4
a/ Preliminary.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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public tries to catch up the previously repressed consumption. Similarly, the
explosion in construction investment reflected a catch-up process in the
provision of housing, which has lagged much behind the developments in other
social welfare areas and has become one of the most serious concerns among
low- and middle-incomte households.' The recent high private consumption and
construction investment did not seem to crowd out equipment investment much,
considering the robust equipment investment level during 1989-91. Still,
although the levels of the various components of aggregate demand seem
socially desirable, in total they are straining the economy's productive
capacity.
1.21 Evidence of overheating is provided in a recent study by the Bank of
Korea (BOK) which shows that actual GNP growth rates in 1990 and 1991 were
higher than "potential' GNP growth rates.2 In response to the overheating of
the economy: the Economic Planning Board (EPB) decided to implement
contractionary policies in 1992. Domest4c demand development during the first
half of 1992 has shown signs of cooling off, most notably in construction
investment
1.22 As far as the composition of GNP by industry is concerned,
agriculture, forestry, md fishing continuously shrank during 1989-91, while
construction showed rapid growth. More importantly, services grew faster than
manufacturing. This reflects in part the shift away from export-oriented
manufacturing in the wake of declining profitability in this sector.
C. Employment, Wages, and Prices
1.23 Employment Trends. During 19b9-91, employment increased at an
average rate of 3.3 percent, compared with the average rate of 4.1 percent
during 1986-88. (See Table 1.2.) The declir.e of employment growth has been
due mostly to the lower job creation as a result of the slower GNP growth, and
also to the introduction of labor-saving technology. Also contributed was the
lower job entrants due to the lower labor force growth. (Labor issues will be
discussed in detail in paras 1.78-1.81.) An important sectoral employment
trend is that there has been P shift of the labor force from manufacturing to
services and construction. During 1989-91, eniployment in manufacturing
increased at an average rate of only 1.9 percent (compared with the average
rate of 10.0 percent during 1986-88), in sharp contrast to an average rate of
14.7 percent in construction and 5.7 percent in services. While the rapid
1 The ratio of the availpble housing units to the total households in
1989 was 71 percent, which is a deterioration from, for example, 73 percent in
1970.
2 Potential GNP was defined as attainable GNP under a natural rate of
unemployment without causing irflation. The BOK employed three different
approaches of estimation including production function approach and obtained
similar results. Potential GNP growth during 1989-91 was estimated at 6.8-7.2
percent based on the production function approach.
increase in employment in construction was due to an unique factor (i.e., a
two million housing unit construction project), the transfer of workers from
manufacturing to services reflected workers' preferences, namely, avoiding so-
called 3D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs. Employment in agriculture,
forestry, and fishing continued to decline. The increase in female employment
was slightly higher than the increase in male employment. Reflecting the
tight labor market situation, the unemployment rate dropped to 2.3 percent in
1991; the economy has thus beer, virtually at full employment in recent years,
Table 1.2: Employment Indicators
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(Rate of change, Z)
Economically active population 4.7 2.6 3.8 2.9 2.8
Male 3.2 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.1
Female 7.0 2.3 5.3 3.0 2.4
Employment 5.5 3.2 3.8 3.0 3.0
Male 4.3 3.7 2.9 2.9 3.5
Female 7.3 2.4 5.2 3.1 2.3
Agriculture, forestry & fishing -2.2 -2.7 -1.9 -3.7 -5.7
Mining and manufacturing 14.7 4.5 2.6 -0.1 1.6
of which: Manufacturing 15.4 5.7 3.7 0.1 1.8
Social overhead capital
and other services 4.4 5.0 6.8 7.1 6.6
Of which: Construction 3.5 11.3 11.3 17.5 15.2
Services 4.5 4.2 6.2 5.7 5.3
Unemployment rate (Z) 3.1 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3
Sourcet National Statistical Office, Monthly Statistics of Korea.
1.24 Waie Developments. With the advent of a more democratic political
system since August 1987, it became more difficult to resist labor's pressure
for substantial wage increases: nominal wages in the manufacturing sector
increased by an average of more than 20 percent during 1988-91, as shown in
Table 1.3. It should be emphasized that although frequent labor strikes have
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been partly responsible for rapid wage increases, the principal c qe has been
the tight labor market situation, especially since 1990. It shoL4d also be
noted that workers' demand for high wage increases was linked to, among
others, the rapidly increasing housing costs, as well as wage repression in
earlier years. Labor productivity in the manufacturing sector increased by an
average of 11 percent during the period, compared with the average of 14
percent auring 1986-88. As a result, unit labor costs increased by an average
of 8 percent during the period, causing a concern for industrial
competitiveness. (See Graph 1.1.) However, it should also be noted that high
wages could have a positive medium-term impact by facilitating the industrial
restructuring, away from the declining labor-intensive industries and towards
the higher value-added capital- and technology- intensive industries.
Table 1.3: Wages, Productivity, and Unit Labor Cost
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(Rate of change, Z)
Wages
All industries 10.1 15.5 21.1 18.8 17.5
Manufacturing 11.6 19.6 25.1 20.2 16.9
Labor productivity a/
All industries 11.7 11.9 6.9 13.8 11.6
Manufacturing 12.4 12.3 6.9 14.3 11.9
Unit labor cost b/
All industries -1.4 3.2 13.3 4.4 5.3
Manufacturing -0.7 6.5 17.1 5.1 4.5
a/ Calculated based on physical output for all regular employees.
b/ Unit labor cost index - wages index / labor productivity index.
Sources: Ministry of Labor; Korea Productivity Center;
staff calculations.
1.25 Alarmed by the recent trend of wage increases, the government
started intervening in the wage settlement process in 1990. An attempt was
made to establish a national wages board similar to that of Singapore, but it
was rejected by the labor unions. The government has asked public
corporations and other public sector agencies to hold down wage increases to a
single-digit, and also recommended the same to large private enterprises.
However, wage guidelines have typically not succeeded, due in part to the
complex wage payment system; labor and management have circumvented the
government's pressure by holding down basic pay but raising other components
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of compensation, such as allowances and bonuses, beyond the guideline.
Consequently, actual wage increases of 18.8 percent in 1990 and 17.2 percent
in 1991 were much higher than "settled' wage increase rates of 9.0 percent in
1990 and 10.5 percent in 1991. This development has prompted the government
to adopt the "total compensation system", whereby a wage guideline is applied
to the total compensation package which comprises basic pay, allowances, and
bonuses. In 1992, the government is imposing a strict guideline of 5 percent
applied to the total compensation package for 780 large, high-wage companies,
government agencies and government-invested enterprises.











1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Year
0 Wage + Labor Productivity O Unit Labor Cost
Sources: Ministry of Labor; Korea Productivity Center.
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1.26 Labor Diaputes. The number of labor disputes skyrocketed during
1987-89, totaling more than 7,000 compared with an annual average of '00
before 1987. (See Table 1.4.) Since 1990, however, the number of labor
disputes declined sharply to pre-1987 levels. However, lost man-days due to
disputes have not decreased proportionally since the recent disputes were
centered in large-size companies and have been of longer duration. For
example, the share of companies with more than 300 employees in total labor
disputes increased to 47 percent in 1991 from 23 percent in 1987 and the
average duration of dispute also increased to 18 days in 1991 compared with 5
days in 1987. Several factors contributed to the decline in labor disputess
(i) both management and labor union have acquired negotiating skills from the
previous disputes, (ii) the radical labor movement has weakened; and (iii) a
common concern about industrial competitiveness has emerged.
Table 1.4: Trends in Labor Disputes
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Number of labor disputes 3749 1873 1616 322 234
Of which:
Illegal (Z) (94.1) (79.6) (68.5) (56.8) (39.7)
Companies with more than
300 employees (Z) (23.7) (24.0) (24.8) (35.1) (47.4)
Man-days lost (million) 6.9 5.4 6.3 4.5 3.3
Average duration (days) 5.3 10.0 19.2 19.1 17.8
Source: Ministry of Labor.
1.27 Price Beh'ivior. After rather stable prices during 1987-89,
inflation flared up in 1990 and 1991, recording the highest increases since
1981. Consumer price inflation accelerated to 8.6 percent in 1990 and 9.7
percent in 1991 compared with the annual average of 5.3 percent during 1987-
89. (See Table 1.5.) Wholesale price inflation likewise jumped to 4.2 percent
in 1990 and 5.4 percent in 1991, in contrast to the annual average of 1.6
percent during 1987-89. In terms of the GNP deflator, inflation similarly
rose to 10.6 percent in 1990 and 10.9 percent in 1991 from the annual average
rate of 4.7 percent during 1987-89.
1.28 This acceleration in inflation during 1990-91 was due essentially to
sharply rising domestic demand, in part made possible by the substantial wage
increases. Since the acceleration of inflation caused even higher wage
demands, we are beginning to see the -mergence of wage-price spirals.
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Expansionary monetary policy in 1990, triggered by an effort to boost the
depressed stock market, also contributed.
Table 1.5: Changes in Price Indices
(1985=100)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(Rate of change, Z)
Wholesale prices 0.5 2.7 1.5 4.2 5.4
Consumer prices 3.0 7.1 5.7 8.6 9.7
GNP deflator 3.5 5.9 4.7 10.6 10.9
Import prices (S) 10.9 14.2 3.3 -3.1 -3.2
(won) 4.0 2.8 -4.5 2.4 0.4
Export prices (S) 8.3 13.5 6.9 0.9 1.4
(won) 1.5 2.2 -1.2 6.7 5.2
Land prices 14.7 27.5 32.0 20.6 12.8
Housing prices 0.5 15.3 14.1 17.1 10.3
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992;
Ministry of Construction; staff calculations.
1.29 Among the components of the CPI, prices of agricultural, livestock,
and marine products increased most rapidly, reflecting a sharp increase in
distribution costs, due to bottlenecks in transportation infrastructure. Also
conspicuous was inflation in service prices as a result of a substantial
increase in labor costs. In fact, high inflation in service prices has been
one of the main reasons for the gap between the CPI inflation rate and the WPI
inflation rate. Among the components of the WPI, agricultural product prices
increased most notably whereas the prices of manufactured products increased
moderately. Prices of imports did not contribute much to the inflation,
moderate depreciation of the won in 1990 and 1991 notwithstanding, since the
dollar prices of imported goods decreased during the period.
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1.30 The area in which inflation has been most serious is real estate.
Land and housing prices increased rapidly at an average annual rate of 23
percent and 15 percent, respectively, during 1988-91, although the increase
rates decelerated in the second half of 1991. The substantial increase in
real estate prices played an important role in accelerating wage-price spirals
since workers' wage demand has been linked to the development of land and
housing prices.B Furthermore, capital gains in real estate further skewed
the distribution of wealth, and exacerbated the sense of relative deprivation
felt by lower and middle income classes.4 6 Although "speculation, on real
estate was mainly responsible for the skyrocketing inflation in land and
housing, government policies such as greenbelt legislation and rigid zoning
practices have also been responsible. It should be noted that rapid increases
in housing prices is one of the main reasons why the consumer price inflation
perceived by the public is higher than the official one; the CPI in Korea does
not include the imputed rental cost of owner-occupied housing and consequently
tends to understate the true rate of inflation.
1.31 Government has singled out inflation reduction as a top priority in
its Economic Management Plan (EMP) for 1992, and aims to contain the CPI
inflation below 8 percent and the WPI rate below 4.5 percent. For this
purpose, in addition to contractionary fiscal and monetary policy, it will
exercise incomes policy such as a strict wage guideline. So far this year,
the CPI and tha WPI inflation rates have decelerated and so too have land and
housing prices.
8 Real wages measured in terms of housing services or land have not
changed much over the period 1974-89, in sharp contrast to an impressive gain
in purchasing power deflated by the CPI. (See Distribution of Income and
Wealth in Korea, Economic Development Institute, forthcoming.)
4 It was estimated that capital gains (including unrealized) from land
was as much as the size of the GNP in 1988. (Source: same as the footnote 3)
6 The distribution of land ownership is extremely concentrated around the
top, as indicated by the fact that the top 5 percent own 65 percent of total
land area. The Gini coefficient of land ownership was 0.849 in 1988, compare"
with 0.653 for Japan in 1987. (See "Housing Prices, Affordability, and
Government Policy in Korea", by K.H. Kim, World Bank, Asia Regional Series
no.99, July 1991.)
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D. Fiscal and Monetary Developments
1.32 Fiscal Developments. After overall budget surpluses during 1987-89,
thanks to robust tax revenues and restrained expenditure, the overall budget
balance of the consolidated public sector turned to a deficit.6 The
consolidated deficit totaled 0.3 percent of GNP in 1990 and widened further to
2.8 percent in 1991. (See Table 1.6.) This turnaround is a result of rapid
expansion in expenditure due to (i) investment needs for infrastructure, (ii)
increased local government finance following the introduction of local
autonomy in 1990; and (iii) higher social expenditures.
1.33 On the revenue side, the tax burden ratio (the ratio of total tax
revenue to GNP) increased moderately to an average of 19.2 percent during
1989-91 from the average of 17.6 percent during 1986-88. The current tax
burden ratio is still low compared with most developed countries and
government aims to increase the ratio up to 22 percent by 1996. Recent
revenue intake has been high, consistently surpassing rather conservative
targets in the budget, thanks largely to the booming economy. Almost half of
the total tax revenue is collected fro- indirect taxes, although recently the
share of direct taxes increased significantly. Among the components of
expenditure, social welfare expenditure expanded rapidly; for example,
expenditure on housing increased by an average of 54.2 percent during 1987-90.
1.34 Recent fiscal practice has seen the routine use of large
supplementary budgets. Such supplementary budgets accounted for 21.1 percent
of the original budget in 1990 and 16.3 percent in 1991. This is a sharp
increase over the 1987 and 1988 supplementaries. Such budgets have provided
strong fiscal stimulus to the economy and contributed to overheating in recent
years. The practice of supplementary budgets is one of the main risks to
fiscal discipline these days when the economy is overheated.
1.35 Another risk is the discretionary power of local government bodies.
Since the introduction of the local autonomy in 1990, provincial and municipal
budgets have exploded; they increased by 83 percent in 1990, making the ratio
of local government expenditure to central government expenditure jump to 45
percent in 1990 from 29 percent in 1989. Local congresses are allowed to
issue bonds up to a certain limit (one billion won) without permission of the
Ministry of Finance. This has resulted in a tendency to be rather liberal in
spending, and not fully coordinated with national development objectives.
1.36 The 1992 budget is 12.8 percent higher than the revised 1991 budget,
but 23.1 percent higher than the original 1991 budget. Such a substantial
increase does not seem to be consistent with contractionary policies envisaged
in the EMP, although the government justifies this by asserting that there
will be no supplementary budget this year; this is rather questionable
considering that there is a presidential election scheduled toward the end of
6 The consolidated public sector comprises the central government, local
government, and non-financial public enterprises.
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this year. The present fiscal stance seems to be at variance with the anti-
inflation objective espoused by the government.
Table 1.6: Fiscal Developments
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a/
(Z of GNP)
Central government
Revenue 18.1 19.0 20.3 20.1 19.1
Expenditure 16.5 16.8 20.0 19.7 20.2
Balance 1.6 2.1 0.3 0.4 -1.1
Local government
Revenue 9.4 9.4 11.0 11.7 10.6
Expenditure 8.8 8.8 10.1 10.9 12.1
Balance 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.8 -1.5
Public enterprises b/
Revenue 4.2 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.2
Expenditure 4.6 4.2 4.1 5.2 5.9
Balance 
-0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.9 -1.6
Consolidated public sector c/
Revenue 22.2 22.8 23.8 25.7 23.4
Expenditure 21.5 21.1 22.7 26.0 26.2
Balance 0.7 1.8 1.0 -0.3 -2.8
a/ Preliminary.
b/ Non-financial.
c/ Central government, local government, and public enterprises.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table 1.7: Functional Classification of General Government Expenditure
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 a/
(I of total expenditure)
General public services 15.1 15.0 15.3 14.9 15.8
Defense 21.2 20.5 18.6 16.1 16.2
Education 16.6 16.1 16.0 26.2 10.3
Health 3.3 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.9
Social security and welfare 5.7 6.3 7.0 7.1 8.0
Housing the community amenities 7.6 7.2 11.9 13.4 12.4
Of which: housing 2.9 3.0 6.3 8.4 6.5
Other community & social services 2.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.4
Economic services 22.1 25.2 24.1 26.6 23.8
a/ Budget.
Sources Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
1.37 Monetary Develo2ments. Monetary growth during the last five years
has tended to be at the upper end of government's target range. Monetary
growth during 1987-89 was rapid, accelerated in 1990, and then returned to
1987-89 level in 1991. As seen in Table 1.8, the pace of monetary growth
1987-89 was set largely by rapid increase in reserve money from the external
sector which the government was unable to fully steriLize. Rapid monetary
increase in 1990 was essentially a consequence of the government's effort to
boost the depressed stock market. In December 1989, the government instructed
commercial banks to lend 2.8 trillion won (which corresponds to 4.7 percent of
M2 as of end of 1989) to investment trust companies for purchasing stocks, an
action eventually financed by an increase is reserve money. The growth rate
of domestic credit similarly accelerated during 1989-91. The government's
target of M2 growth in 1992 is 18.5 percent, the same as the actual K2 growth
in 1991.
1.38 Differential developments in three monetary aggregates, namely,
reserve money, M2 (money in circulation, demand deposits, and time and savings
deposits) and M3 (H2 plus non-bank financial institution deposits and
debenture issues plus commercial bills and certificates of deposits) reflect
changes in the financial system and carry implications for monetary
- 17 -
Table 1.8s Monetary Developments
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
(average during the year)
(Rate of change, 2)
Reserve money 19.2 41.0 36.9 24.7 17.4
Ml a/ 19.5 15.5 14.1 18.1 16.1
M2 bl 18.8 18.8 18.4 21.2 18.6
(government target) (15-18) (15-18) (15-18) (15-19) (17-19)
M3 c/ 30.8 28.5 27.8 28.6 23.3
Domestic credit A d/ 15.2 12.4 23.4 22.5 22.0
Of which:
Private sector credit 12.9 16.6 22.5 23.3 22.7
Domestic credit B e/ 16.4 18.7 29.5 29.3 25.3
Of which:
Private sector credit 16.5 23.0 30.1 29.5 25.0
M2 / Reserve money 7.4 6.3 5.4 5.3 5.3
(- Money multiplier)
M2 / M3 (Z) 44.0 40.5 37.9 35.4 33.4
a/ MI - currency plus demand deposits.
b/ M2 - Ml plus time and savings deposits.
c/ M3 - M2 plus other financial insticution deposits and debenture issues
plus commercial bills and CDs.
d/i Domestic credit extended by banking system.
e/ Domestic credit A plus domestic credit extended by nonbank financial
institutions.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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management. The money multiplier (M2 / reserve money) declined sharply from
7.4 in 1987 to 5.4 in 1989, due to a rapid increase in reserve money from the
external sector, and since then it has remained stable at around 5.3. M3 has
been growing faster than H2, reflecting a rapid expansion in non-bank
financial institutions. Accordingly, the ratio of M2 to M3 declined steadily
from 44 percent in 1987 to 33.4 percent in 1991. In this regard, the
effectiveness of monetary targeting using M2 as the sole indicator has become
weaker and, as a result, recertly new monetary aggregates such as H2B, which
excludes long-term savings deposits but includes short-term deposits at non-
bank institutions, are also being considered.
1.39 Monetary authorities continue to rely heavily on direct control of
the scale and direction of bank lending, in the absence of effective tools for
indirect monetary control, such as reserve requirements, the discount rate,
and open market operations. Upward adjustments of the required reserve ratio
have been sparingly used because the commercial banking system has tended to
suffer from reserve deficiency. Currently, the required reserve ratio is 11
percent for demand deposits and 8 percent for savings deposits. The scope for
the discount rate policy has been limite4 since the bulk of the BOK loans are
automatic rediscounts of policy loans e7 ended by the banking sector. Open
market operations have been retarded by in underdeveloped money market, lack
of adequate securities for trading, and the absence of the secondary markets.
1.40 As a preliminary step toward open market operations, issues and
redemption of Monetary Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) have been used as the major
tool for absorbing liquidity. MSBs are issued by the BOK at substantially
below market interest rates, currently around 13 percent compared with around
18 percent for one-year corporate bonds. Interest rates on MSBs are
determined by the BOK and they have not changed frequently. No regular
auction market for MSBs exists and commercial banks and non-bank financial
institutions are persuaded to purchase the amounts set by the Ministry of
Finance. Currently, about 40 percent of the newly issued MSBs are purchased
by commercial banks and the rest by non-bank financial institutions, such as
securities and insurance companies. There does exist a secondary market for
MSBs and the current rate is around 16.5 percent with the rather high margin
of 3.5 points, suggesting that primary purchasers are being insufficiently
compensated. The government aims to liberalize the interest rates of MSBs in
the third phase of the interest rate deregulation program scheduled for 1994-
96. (See para 1.43.)
1.41 Although MSBs played an important role in partially sterilizing
liquidity during the period of current accotunt surpluses, they put pres .re
not only on the balance sheets of the BOK, but also on the liquidity position
of the financial institutions, resulting in crowding out the shallow market
and often seriously depressing the corporate bond market. In addition, the
interest bill on the outstanding stock of MSBs in itself has become a source
of reserve money expansion. Consequently, Foreign Exchange Stabilization Fund
Bonds (FESBs) and Treasury Bills have recently been used increasingly, in
effect transferring part of the financial burden from the BOK to the
government. Accordingly, the issuance of MSBs has declined from 19.8 trillion
won in 1989 and 20.3 trillion won in 1990 to 18.9 trillion won in 1991, while
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the issuance of FESBs and T-bills averaged 2.4 trillion won and 2.0 trillion
won a year, respectively, during 1989-91.
1.42 The government continues to guide the financial system through
credit control. Most notably, banking institutions are subject to mandatory
targets for lending to selected subsectors which are conside:ed either less-
privileged or strategic. For example, each commercial bank is required to
maintain its credit outstanding to small- and medium-sized firms above 35
percent of its total loans outstanding. The share of policy loans extended by
the banking sector continues to be about 46 percent of total domestic credit.
(This issue of policy loans will be discussed further in para 1.84.)
1.43 Domastic Financial Liberalization. Since the 1980s, several
attempts have been made to enhance the efficiency of the financial sector
through liberalization. Most recently, in December 1988, the authorities
attempted to implement gradual interest rate deregulation plan. However, the
outcome was less favorable than anticipated, mainly due to the turnaround in
macroeconomic situation in 1989. The authorities, without effective tools for
indirect monetary control, were forced to increase the money supply to avoid a
rapid rise in interest rates, which could put pressure on inflation.
Stabilizing interest rates became a higher priority as the rising interest
costs exacerbated the already depressed export and investment. Consequently,
the authorities effectively postponed the implementation.
1.44 In August 1991, the government anrnounced a new four-phase interest
deregulation schedule, in coordination with the opening up of the capital
market. (See paras 1.65-1.66.) According to the schedule, interest rates are
to be deregulated gradually since it was feared that rapid deregulation might
cause instability in financial markets.7 Lending rates are to be liberalized
faster than deposit rates, and among deposit rates, rates on long-term, large-
size deposits are to be liberalized first.
1.45 The first phase of reform took effect November 1991 and was
completed in June 1992. During the first phase, lending rates such as bank
overdraft loan rates and short-term finance companies' commercial paper rates,
were deregulated. Also deregulated were deposit rates for, among others,
large-denomination bank certificates of deposits and securities companies'
repurchase agreements and rates on long-term deposits with maturities over 3
years. During the second phase, which will extend through the end of 1993,
the government will deregulate all lending rates at both bank and non-bank
financial institutions, excluding policy loans, as well as long-term deposit
rates with maturities over 2 years. In the third stage, scheduled for 1994-
96, lending rates on policy loans, rates on MSBs, and deposit rates with
maturities over 2 years would be deregulated. Finally in the fourth stage,
after 1996, all remaining restrictions on deposit rates, as well as coupon
rates on government and public bonds are to be lifted. While the government
is committed to the liberalization ir principle, the actual speed of
7 In fact, rapid full-scale financial market deregulations turned out to
be costly, for example, in the Philippines and Indonesia.
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implementation will depend on macroeconomic onditions at various points over
the next several years.
1.46 As far as preconditions for successful interest rate liberalization
are concerned, one positive development is that the financial health of
commercial banks has improved significantly during the past few years. Other
positive de-elopments are enhanced productivity in banking and lowered entry
barriers to banking. On the other hand, the issue of policy loans will need
to be carefully addressed in the design of effective financial liberalization.
Another concern is the current supervision framework to ensure the financial
discipline of commercial banks. These issaes are discussed at great length in
paras 1.82-1.86.
1.47 Since the implementation of the first phase in November 1991, about
10 percent of the lending rates have been deregulated. Interest rates
initially jumped by 2-3 percentage points and then leveled off, decreasing by
1-1.5 percentage points, dispelling overnment's worry that reform would lead
to abrupt interest rate increase. (In fact, it is argued that the increase in
actual borrowing cost may not be significant because the "compensating
balance" practice, i.e., a substantial portion of a requested loan to be
deposited in return for the loan, has been discouraged since the introduction
of interest rate deregulation.)
E. Trade Account Performance
1.48 The Current Account. Korea's current account balance has steadily
worsened since 1989, after a period of expanding surpluses during 1986-88.
(See Table 1.9.) The main source of this deterioration was sluggish
merchandise xports; merchandise xports in US dollars increased by an average
of only 5.2 percent during 1989-1991, in sharp contrast to the average
increase of 31.2 percent during the export boom of 1986-88 . Also responsible
was a rapid increase in merchandise imports; merchandise imports in US dollars
increased rapidly, at an average rate of 16.3 percent during 1989-91, higher
than the average increase of 13.4 percent during 1986-88. The invisible trade
balance also showed a similar pattern, turning to deficit in 1990 and 1991 due
to a rapid increase in payments for travel and transportation. Recent current
account deficits have been financed by increases in external borrowing and, to
a lesser extent, drawdowns in gross official reserves. The current account
balance recorded during the first half of 1992 was $4.1 billion.
1.49 Trade Composition. Recent trends in export composition clearly
shows that Korea is moving into more sophisticated exports. There has been a
definite shift away from primary goods towards manufactured goods. Also,
within manufactured goods there has been a shift away from light industry
items to heavy and chemical industry items. (See Table 1.10.) The share of
garment dropped most notably, reflecting difficulties of labor-intensive
industries. The share of technology- and skill-intensive items such as color
televisions, personal computers, and passenger cars, which had increased
sharply between 1980 and 1988, increased only slightly during 1989-91, due in
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part to the sluggish technology upgrading and also to the turnaround in the
won-yen rate.
Table 1.9: Summary of Balance of Payments, 1987-91
(US$ million)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current account balance 9854 14161 5055 -2179 -8827
(z of GNP) (7.6) (8.2) (2.4) (-0.9) (-3.1)
Trade balance 7659 11445 4597 -2004 -7065
Exports 46244 59648 61409 63124 69522
Imports 38585 48203 56812 65127 76587
Invisible trade balance 977 1267 211 -451 -1615
Credit 10010 11252 12642 14269 15469
Debit 9033 9985 12431 14719 17085
Transfers (net) 1218 1448 247 275 -147
Long-term capital (net) -5836 -2733 -3363 548 4349
Of which:
Loans L.Ad foreign investment -1945 -1892 -1105 33 3019
Basic balance 4018 11428 1692 -1632 -4478
Short-term capital (net) -7 1336 60 3334 362
Errors and omissions 1191 -589 701 -1976 375
Overall balance 5202 12175 2453 -274 -3740
Sources Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table 1.10: Composition of Exports by Major Item
1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991
Primary 9.1 8.0 6.1 5.8 5.4 4.7
Manufacturing 90.9 92.0 93.9 94.2 94.6 95.3
Light 49.4 38.6 41.8 42.0 41.1 n.a.
Of which:
Textiles 12.9 9.3 9.3 10.2 10.9 n.a.
Garments 15.9 14.1 13.9 14.0 11.7 n.a.
Footwear 5.2 5.2 6.3 5.8 6.6 5.3
Heavy and .. ,mical 41.5 53.4 52.1 52.2 53.6 n.a.
Of which:
Iron and steel 9.0 8.1 6.5 6.9 6.5 6.3
Nonferrous metals 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.3 n.a.
Chemicals 4.4 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.6 n.a.
Electrical & electronics 12.1 16.1 26.8 27.4 27.4 27.9
Transport equipment 5.6 20.0 9.9 7.9 8.8 n.a.
Of which:
Ships 3.5 16.6 2.9 2.9 4.3 5.7
Passenger cars 0.3 1.7 5.5 3.3 2.9 3.5
Sources: Korea Foreign Trade Association; Office of Customs Administration.
1.50 The composition of imports also shows a trend away from primary
goods towards manufactures. (See Table 1.11.) For example, the share of oil
bill declined from 25 percent in 1980 to 10 percent in 1991, mainly reflecting
import price changes. Among capital equipment, the share of general machinery
continued to increase due to brisk equipment investment in manufacturing
sector.
1.51 Market Diversification. Korea has been attempting to break out of
its pattern of importing capital goods and intermediate inputs from Japan and
exporting finished goods to the U.S. There has been some progress in trade
diversification between 1988 and 1991, both in exports and in imports. The
share of Korean exports shipped to the U.S. declined steadily from 35.3
percent in 1988 to 25.8 percent in 1991, in contrast to little change between
1985 and 1988. (See Table 1.12.) This was mainly due to a loss of price
competitiveness as a result of wage hikes, and consequent market share losses
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in labor-intensive items such as garment and footwear to other developing
countries like China and the ASEAN countries. Trade diplomacy with the U.S.
also contributed to this trend. The share of the exports going to Japan also
declined to some extent from 19.8 percent to 17.2 percent between 1988 and
1991, in contrast to 4.8 percentage points increase between 1985 and 1988
exports to the EC countries has not changed much, at around 13 percent. It is
noteworthy that the share of exports to the rest of tbi world increa ed
significantly by 12 percentage points between 1988 and 1991; Lor InsLal1ue, tile
share of the ASEAN countries increased by 4.9 percentage points while the
share of the socialist countries (notably China) increased by 2.4 percentage
points.
Table 1.11: Composition of Imports by Major Item
1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991
Primary 49.8 37.0 26.5 27.2 26.6 26.9
Of which:
Crude oil 25.3 17.9 7.1 8.0 9.1 10.0
Manufacturing 50.2 63.0 73.5 72.8 73.4 73.1
Of which:
Chemicals 13.9 15.3 19.2 18.7 20.3 n.a.
Capital equipment 23.0 35.6 36.8 36.4 36.5 37.0
Of which:
General 8.1 8.1 11.5 13.0 13.7 14.2
machinery
Electrical 7.4 11.6 17.9 16.3 15.7 n.a.
and electronics
Transport 5.8 14.9 7.1 6.3 6.4 n.a.
equipment
Consumer goods 3.0 3.1 4.4 4.5 4.7 n.a.
Sources: Korea Foreign Trade Association; Office of Customs Administration.
1.52 The share of imports coming from Japan dropped steadily from 30.7
percent to 25.9 percent between 1988 and 1991, in striking contrast to 6.4
percentage points increase between 1985 and 1988, as seen in Table 1.12. It
has been mainly due to the government's efforts to divert imports away from
Japan and toward the U.S. to rectify both chronic bilateral trade deficits
with Japan and surpluses with the U.S. The share of imports from the U.S.,
however, declined slightly between 1988 and 1991. The EC's share of Korean
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imports has not changed much, at approximately 12 percent. Similar to the
trend in exports, the share of the rest of the countries increased by 5.8
percentage points (2.1 percentage points increase from the socialist
countries, mainly China).
Table 1.12: Exports and Imports by Region
1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991
(Share in total, Z)
Exports
United States 26.3 35.5 35.3 33.1 29.8 25.8
Japan 17.4 15.0 19.8 21.6 19.4 17.2
EC 15.5 10.8 13.4 11.9 13.7 13.5
Other 40.8 38.7 31.4 33.5 37.1 43.4
Of which:
ASEAN 6.5 5.0 5.0 6.4 7.8 9.9
Socialist countries 0.2 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.7 3.3
Imports
United States 21.9 20.8 24.6 25.9 24.3 23.2
Japan 26.3 24.3 30.7 28.4 26.6 25.9
EC 7.2 9.8 11.7 10.6 12.1 12.1
Other 44.5 45.0 33.0 35.2 37.1 38.8
Of which:
ASEAN 6.6 8.7 6.6 6.7 7.3 7.5
Socialist countries 0.2 1.9 3.2 3.7 4.1 5.3
(in US$ million)
Trade balance
United States -284 4265 8647 4728 2418 -335
Japan -2818 -3017 -3885 -3992 -5936 -8764
EC 1096 196 2111 915 455 -151
Other -2781 -2296 2012 -740 -1764 -405
Sources: Korea Foreign Trade Association; Office of Customs Administration.
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1.53 The bilateral trade balance with the U.S. steadily deteriorated
since 1989. recording a deficit in 1991 for the first time since 1982, after
registering huge surpluses during 1986-88. In turn, the trade deficit with
Japan widened even further during 1989-91, reflecting Korea's structural
dependence on Japanese machinery and equipment. The trade balance with the EC
countries also worsened since 1989, recording a deficit in 1991. Accordingly,
in 1991 Korea registered bilateral trade deficits vis-a-vis each of its major
trading partners.
1.54 Mport ComTetitiveness. Lackluster export performance in recent
years has been due in part to external factors such as sluggishness in major
export markets, especially in the U.S., but primarily to an erosion of export
competitiveness. Among the factors contributing to an erosion of
competitiveness, difficulties related to labor and technology are most
serious. As discussed in para 1.24, during 1988-91 manufacturing wages
increased by cumulative 82 percent whereas labor productivity in manufacturing
increased by cumulative 45 percent, resulting in a cumulative increase of 33
percent in unit labor cost. In comparison with competing countries during
1988-90, Korean manufacturing unit labor cost (in US dollars) increased by 52
percent in contrast to 34 percent increase in Taiwan, China or 6 percent
decrease in Japan. However, it should be also noted that if compared for a
longer period, for example, between 1980 and 1990, the increase rate of
manufacturing unit labor cost in Korea is substantially lower than in Taiwan,
China or Japan, as shown in Graph 1.2.
1.55 In addition, frequent work stoppages and decline in work discipline
led to a deterioration in quality. The rejection rate for export items
inspected by the Office of Manufacturing Promotion jumped from 3.0 percent in
1988 to 5.3 percent in 1991, much higher than, for example, the rejection rate
of 2.5 percent for Taiwan, China or 1.5 percent for Japan in 1989. It should
be noted that a substantial part of cost-push pressure on export prices has
been absorbed by squeezing profit margins, for fear of losing markets. As a
result, the profitability of export-oriented firms has deteriorated, and in
fact since 1988 it has become lower than that of domestic-oriented firms,
reversing the previous trend. For example, the ratio of net profit to total
sales for export-oriented firms declined from 2.0 percent in 1987 to 0.6
percent in 1990, while for domestic-oriented firms it averaged a consistent
1.7-2.4 percent over the period.
1.56 Government has identified difficulties in technology upgrading as a
major culprit. In fact, it seems that Korean firms have not been fast enough
in upgrading quality and moving towards more sophisticated items. For
example, Hyundai automobiles was very successful with a model which requires
lower-end technical sophistication, but subsequently it has been struggling
with a model which commands medium-level sophistication. The situation is
similar for consumer electronics such as VCRs. As shown in Table 1.10, this
difficulty could be exemplified by the fact that while the export share of
electrical and electronic products and passenger cars (which have the highest
ratios of R&D expenditure to total sales among manufacturing), increased
sharply up to 1988, with products of lower-end technology sophistication,
since then the share has been stagnant due partly to slow transition to the
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more sophisticated technology ladder.@ Technology issues are further
discussed in paras 1.89-1.90.
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Source: Korea Labor Institute, Wage-Related Statistics, 1991.
8 It was argued that the largest gainers among Korean exports in the
U.S. market between 1975 and 1988 were electric and electronic products and
transport equipment mainly due to the Ihighest R&D investment / sales ratios;
For example, the ratio of R&D expenditure to total sales for electric and
electronic products and transport equipment was 3.66 percent and 3.73 percent
compared with 1.88 percent for total manufacturing. See wA Review of Korea's
Trade Pattern' by D.M.Leipziger and S.Y.Song, World Bank, Asia Regional Series
no.96, March 1991.
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1.57 There are two other factors which contributed further to the
erosion of competitiveness. One is a rapid increase in transportation cost
due to insufficient expansion of roads, railroads, and ports. The share of
transportation cost in total sales of manufacturing increased from 1.5 percent
to 2.3 percent between 1987 and 1990. Investment in infrastructure has been
stagnant during the 1980s, at 3-4 percent of GNP, due to a shift towards
social welfare expenditures. In order to ease infrastructure problems, the
government plans to increase infrastructure investment up to 5 percent of GNP
during 1992-96. Competitiveness has also been affected by exchange rate
developments; the real effective exchange rate of the won, defined as trade-
weighted exchange rate adjusted for differentials in inflation vis-s-vis
trading partners, appreciated by 27 percent between 1987 and 1989, in contrast
to, for instance, 3 percent depreciation for the real effective exchange rate
of the Japanese yen. (The exchange rate issue 's further discussed in paras
1.67-1.69.)
1.58 In general, the government has avoided intensification of direct
export promotion measures such as providing more preferential export credit.
Rather, it has concentrated on enhancing the competitiveness of manufacturing
through efforts to limit wage increases, improve labor productivity, and
promote technology development. It is worth noting that in 1991 the
government instructed each of the top conglomerates to choose three core
businesses, for which bank credit ceilings for the group as a whole was to be
exempted, with a view to encouraging specialization and hence enhancing
competitiveness. All in all, the government policy of improving the
environment for industrial competitiveness rather than extending direct
support for export is expected to continue within the industrial policy
framework of the Seventh Five-Year Plan.
1.59 Trade Diplomacy. The process of trade liberalization, underway
since the early 1980s, was accelerated during 1987-88 in the wake of large
trade surpluses and pressures from trading partners, particularly the U.S.
During 1984-88, the average unweighted tariff rate was reduced from 24 percent
to 18 percent. The reduction of quantitative restrictions was more
conspicuous; the ratio of restricted items to total items was reduced from
19.6 percent to 4.6 percent. However, the number of agricultural imports
subject to quantitative restrictions has not declined much, from 26 percent to
20 percent, while for nonagricultural items it declined from 17 percent to
less than 2 percent. Subsequently, under the 1989-91 trade liberalization
program, the average tariff rate was further reduced to 11.5 percent. The
government lifted virtually all remaining restrictions on manufactured imports
and launched the liberalization program of agricultural imports, consistent
with Korea's GATT commitment to phase out all remaining restrictions on
imports, predominantly agricultural, forestry, and fishery product, by July 1,
1997, and its bilateral negotiations with trading partners. However,
elimination of restrictions on agricultural imports has been slower than some
trading partners would have liked. According to the government's plan during
9 Korea disinvoked Article XVIII:B of the GATT (on trade restrictions for
balance of payments purposes) on January 1, 1990 due to the improvement of its
balance of payments situation and reserve position.
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1992-94. the average tariff rate will be reduced to 8 percent, comparable to
that in industrial countries, and the ratio of restricted items for
agricultural imports will be reduced to 8 percent.10 Government will also
abide by the results of the Uruguay Round negotiations. The envisaged
liberalization of agricultural imports will demand considerable efforts to
mitigate the substantial adjustments required in the agricultural sector.
1.60 Another area of negotiations for liberalization has been the
services market. Although Korea progressively liberalized restrictions on
trade in services during the latter half of 1980s, foreign access to the
services markets remains more restricted than to goods markets. Improved
access to the Korean services market has been being taken up by trading
partners in the context of bilateral discussions such as financial policy
talks with the U.S., as well as negotiations in the Uruguay Round. In the
financial services area, since 1984 the government has been moving toward a
direction of national treatment of foreign bank branches in terms of
regulation and supervision, but they were still treated differently in certain
respects. Recently in 1990 and 1991, however, a number of important steps
have been taken to place foreign and domestic financial institutions closer to
an equal footing, including the elimination of the ceiling on foreign banks'
paid-in capital, the easing of restrictions on multiple branching of foreign
banks, an increase in local currency funding opportunities for foreign banks,
and permission for foreign banks to participate in the full range of trust
business. The government also began authorizing the operation of foreign
securities companies in late 1990, with certain conditions such as reciprocal
opportunities in the home countries of the foreign firms, in preparation tor
stock market opening up in January 1992. The life insurance market has been
opened to foreign branch offices since 1987, and to joint ventures since
January 1988. Similarly, liberalization measures were also recently
undertaken in other services sectors, especially vis-a-vis the U.S., such as
advertising, wholesaling and retailing, maritime transportation, travel
services, movies, and data base and data processing. Bilateral negotiations
are still going on in areas such as telecommunications with the U.S. and
intellectual property protection with the EC.11
1.61 In turn, restrictions on Korean exports to industrial countries have
continued. Various non-tariff barriers, such as voluntary exports restreints,
have been imposed by trading partners in addition to regulations by Multi-
Fiber Agreements on textiles and clothing. These restrictions cover a broad
range of manufactured goods, and are imposed by some 20 countries. The share
of Korean exports subject to quantitative restrictions has not changed much
during 1988-90, at around 17 percent of total exports. The number of
10 Korea submitted a list of 15 items, including rice, that could not be
liberalized because of Korea's 'Non Trade Concerns" to the GATT Negotiating
Group on Agriculture late 1990.
11 Korea was designated a "priority foreign country' with regard to
telecommunication trade practices in February 1989 in the context of the U.S.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, and was put on a "priority watch list'
for possible violations of intellectual property rights in May 1990.
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anti-dumping and countervailing duties imposed declined since 1987, but
administrative and technical barriers are still cited by Korean exporters as
active impediments to advanced country markets.
F. Capital Account Performance
1.62 External Debt Developments. During 1986-89, Korea's external debt
declined rapidly from the peak of $47.1 billion in 1985 (when Korea was the
fourth most heavily indebted LDC in the world) to $32.8 billion in 1989.
Long-term liabilities were prepaid using part of the current account surpluses
registered then. Since then, however, external debt increased to $34 billion
in 1990 and further to $39.3 billion in 1991, the highest since 1987, as the
external accounts went into deficit. (See Table 1.13.) Nevertheless, the
amount of external debt does not cause a serious concern unlike in the mid-
1980s, as the debt to GNP ratio continued to decline to 14 percent in 1991
compared with 45 percent in 1986. The debt service ratio also declined to
10.7 percent in 1990 from 26.7 percent in 1986. Moreover, net external debt.
i.e., gross external debt minus foreign assets, declined substantially from
$34.7 billion to $7.2 billion between 1986 and 1990, as foreign assets
accumulated rapidly. The increase in external debt is expected to continue
for some years to come due to anticipated current account deficits.
1.63 Direct Forei&n Investment. The government has been progressively
liberalizing direct foreign investment (DFI) since 1984, when the previous
positive system for approving direct investment was replaced by a negative
system. The amount of DFI investment (approvals) substantially increased from
$0.4 billion to $1.3 billion between 1986 and 1988, and then it declined to
$1.1 billion in 1989 and further to $0.8 billion in 1990, before increasing
again to $1.4 billion in 1991. (See Table 1.14.) Around a half of the direct
investment has come from Japan; Japan's portion has declined steadily from 60
percent to 40 percent between 1987 and 1990. The share of investment from the
U.S. increased from 16 percent in 1987 to 30 percent in 1990. In
manufacturing, while DFI was concentrated on machinery and electric and
electronics during 1987-88, DFI in chemicals and transport equipment
accelerated during 1989-90. Among services, investment in hotels boomed
during 1986-89 in the wake of the Seoul Olympics, whereas investment in the
financial sector accelerated since 1990 due to opening up of capital market.
Recently, foreign investment has been further liberalized in a number of
areas, including pharmaceutical manufacturing, cosmetic wholesaling, data
processing, travel agencies, advertising agencies, general foreign trade,
alcoholic beverage wholesaling, and computer communications. The government
also revised the Foreign Capital Inducement Act in March 1991 in order to
speed up the foreign investment approval process.
1.64 On the other hand, there also has been a substantial movement in the
opposite direction, i.e., direct foreign investment by Koreans. Korea's DPI
has significant implications on the changing pattern of comparative advantage
and ensuing industrial restructuring. The amount of overseas investment
increased slowly between 1986 and 1989, and then doubled to $1020 million in
199U and increased further to $1125 million in 1991. (See Table 1.14.) Rapid
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increases have occurred especially in Southeast Asia and China. Korea's DFI
in Asia occurred predominantly in Indonesia ($403 million during 1989-91),
mainly in oil and gas. It also occurred, to a lesser extent, in Malaysia ($89
million during 1989-91), China ($65 million), the Philippines ($54 million)
and Thailand ($54 million), primarily in labor-intensive garment and assembly-
type manufacturing, in the wake of labor disputes a:.d high wage increases at
home. Korean companies have also initiated joint venture investments in
Eastern Europe, mostly in general trading and assembly type manufacturing,
efforts aimed at penetrating new markets.
Table 1.13: External Debt Developments a/
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Gross external debt 46.7 39.8 35.7 32.8 34.0 39.3
($ bil)
Medium- & long-term 80.2 76.7 72.6 70.1 68.2 n.a.
debt (Z)
Short-term debt (2) 19.8 23.3 27.4 29.9 31.8 n.a.
Foreign assets ($ bil) 12.0 13.2 23.9 26.5 26.8 n.a.
Net external debt ($ bil) 34.7 26.6 11.8 6.3 7.2 n.a.
Debt service payments 11.2 18.2 10.5 8.8 8.3 n.a.
(5 billion)
Principal repayments (Z) 65.6 82.4 71.7 67.9 67.7 n.a.
Interest payments (Z) 34.4 17.6 28.3 32.1 32.3 n.a.
Debt service ratio (Z) 26.7 32.3 14.8 11.8 10.7 n.a.
Debt / GNP ratio (2) 45.5 31.0 21.1 15.6 14.4 14.0
Growth rate of ext. debt(Z) -0.9 -14.8 -10.3 -8.2 3.7 15.5
a/ Discrepancies exist between the figures in the World Debt Tables and the
Korean government figures. For example, total external debt in 1990 was
$31.7 billion according to the Korean authorities.
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, for 1986-90; Ministry of Finance, for
199i.
- 31 -
Table 1.14: Direct Foreign Investment
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Direct Investment by Foreigners
Total ($ million) 355 1060 1283 1090 803 n.a.
(share in total, Z)
By country
Japan 56.0 59.8 49.5 49.2 40.5 n.a.
United States 35.8 16.3 26.2 30.0 30.0 n.a.
By industry
Manufacturing 50.7 59.9 62.4 62.1 66.6 n.a.
Chemicals 3.1 7.3 9.9 14.9 16.2 n.a.
Machinery 3.6 34.0 24.0 8.2 9.4 n.a.
Electric and 8.3 25.2 24.7 13.6 9.8 n.a.
electronics
Transport equipment 23.5 5.9 4.9 12.9 15.3 n.a.
Services 48.2 39.8 36.3 37.6 32.8 n.a.
Hotel 45.6 34.0 24.0 25.4 7.2 n.a.
Finance 1.2 2.7 9.6 6.0 17.6 n.a.
Overseas Investment by Koreans
Total (S million) 172 397 213 492 1020 1125
(share in total, Z)
By region
Southeast Asia 4.2 33.0 19.5 25.2 30.3 38.3
North America 46.0 44.5 45.2 46.5 47.3 41.2
Europe 3.2 1.7 8.8 3.7 9.1 8.2
By industry
Mining 42.8 50.9 30.5 15.5 14.9 n.a.
Manufactuting 40.8 39.7 35.0 45.3 53.5 n.a.
Trading 8.3 5.1 19.0 12.2 21.6 n.a.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
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1.65 Liberalizing Portfolio Foreign Investment. The international-
ization of Korea's capital market has been carried out cautiously since the
announcement of the long-term plan in 1981. Since 1984, limited indirect
investment in Korean stocks has been allowed through foreign investment funds,
the Korea Fund and Korea-Europe Fund. Foreign securities companies were
allowed to open representative offices, but they were not allowed to conduct
domestic business. The authorities also allowed certain Korean companies to
issue equity-linked bonds and depository receipts in international capital
markets within specified limits. Further steps were taken following the
announcement of a capital market internationalization program for the period
1988-92. The authorities established a third closed-end equity fund, the
Korea Asia Fund, in 1991, permitted direct transactions among foreigners of
Korean stocks acquired through equity-linked bonds, and created three matching
equity funds.
1.66 Starting in January 1992, foreigners were allowed to invest directly
in Korean stocks, subject to a 10 percent limit of total outstanding shares of
each listed company and a 3 percent limit for each foreign investor. Free
repatriation of capital is allowed in principle. Portfolio investment by
foreigners was smooth and steady so far, dispelling government's worry about
abrupt capital movements. During January 3-March 13, $662 million has been
invested, of which about 50 percent came from the UK and 15 percent from the
US and none from Japan. Investments have been concentrated on low price-
earnings ratio (PER) stocks. Foreign capital inflows could not revive the
depressed stock market; the composite stock price index temporarily shot up to
700 from 630 and then dropped to 600 level afterwards. In fact, the Korean
stock market has been continuously depressed since April 1989 when the stock
price index reached the peak at 1000 level, government's various efforts
notwithstanding. Considering the current low stock price index, considerable
foreign investment is anticipated. In March 1992, the government announced
the schedule for further capital market liberalization in the context of the
Korea-US Financial Policy Talks, including a short-term plan (1992-93), which
comprises national treatment of foreign financial institutions investing in
Korean stocks and extension of the daily fluctuating range of the foreign
exchange rate.
1.67 Exchange Rate Management. The Korean won was "undervalued" during
1985-88 due to the sudden realignment of the hard currencies in the Plaza
Agreement of September 1985. The Korean government was reluctant to allow the
won to appreciate as Korea was enjoying the current account surpluses thanks
to the enhanced price competitiveness, especially vis-a-vis Japan. The
government allowed a moderate appreciation in 1987 and a sharp appreciation in
1988, due to the pressure by trading partners, especially the U.S., and also
to difficulties in monetary control and ensuing inflationary pressure. (See
Table 1.15 and Graph 1.3.) However, trading partners, notably the U.S.,
continued to complain that the exchange rate was being manipulated by the
Korean government and that transparency in exchange rate management was
required. It prompted the government to change the exchange rate management
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system from the previous "basket system", a managed float, to more market-
oriented "market-average exchange rate (MAR) system" in March 1990.12
Table 1.15: Exchange Rate Developments
(1980 = 100)
Nominal Effective Real Effective
Exchange Rate a/ Exchange Rate b/




















1992 I . 71.7 95.0
II 70.3 93.9
B/ Trade-weighted average of nominal exchange rates; an increase in the ind.ex
indicates appreciation.
b/ Trade-weighted average of real exchange rates (nominal rates adjusted for
differential inflation); an increase in the index indicates appreciation.
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; staff calculations.
12 With the previous basket system, government's policy consideration was
also a factor in the exchange rate determination, in additien to the movements
of trading partners' currencies.
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1.68 Under the MAR system, the exchange rate of the won vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar in the interbank market was allowed to float within a daily
trading range of +/- 0.4 percent of the weighted average of the previous day's
interbank rates for spot transactions (i.e., market average rate). The
authorities widened the daily range for fluctuation to +/- 0.6 percent since
September 1991 and widened it further to +/- 0.8 percent from July 1, 1992.
Since the introduction of the MAR system, the volume of transactions in the
foreign exchange market has increased rapidly, from less than $100 million per
day An 1989 to about $300 million per day. The interbank exchange rates of
the won against currencies other than the U.S. dollar are determined in
relation to the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against these currencies in
international markets.
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1.69 It is argued that the undervalued won circa 1986 effectively
delayed the necessary structural adjustment in export and manufacturing
sectors. For exampie, Korean firms neglected medium- and long- term
investment in structural adjustment as exports of traditional labor-intensive
industries increased very fast mainly due to the undervalued won. It should
be also pointed out that the rapid appreciation of the won by 27 percent in
terms of real effective exchange rate during 1988-89 diverted resources
towards the non-tradable sector by squeezing the profitability of the export
sector, and hence contributed to the overheating of the domestic demand during
1990-91. It is argued that the appreciation of the won should have been
allowed earlier in a gradual and steady fashion and that the current account
surplus should have been used for technology and manpower development.
G. Short- and Medium- Term Prospects
Short Term Outlook
1.70 One obv.aus approach to ease overheating of the economy is
implementing contractionary policies, which the Korean government chose to
adopt in its Economic Management Plan (EMP) for 1992. Fiscal discipline of
the government is crucial for the success of this option. In this regard, the
rigidity of public expenditure due to, among others, social welfare demands
can be a binding constraint, and therefore, the effectiveness of taxation
would have to be enhanced. For example, the tax burden ratio, which is
currently less than 20 percent, may need to be raised, especially by
strengthening taxes on land.13
1.71 An alternative solution to overheating would be accelerating the
pace of capital account liberalization, hence allowing foreign capital inflows
and allowing the won to appreciate. With this approach, Korea could narrow
the savings-investment gap and lessen the inflationary pressure. In fact,
experiences of Japan and Taiwan, China since the mid-1980s showed that the
appreciation has effectively contributed to the successful industrial
restructuring. This approach would have negative aspects, however. For one,
if combined with high wage increases, it would seriously damage the
competitiveness of labor-intensive small and medium industries. Then, the
question is whether the social safety net would be readily available for the
workers in the depressed industries and also whether the labor market would be
sufficiently fluid for the transfer of workers. For another, it would depress
exports and result in an increase in external debt. Depressed exports, if
combined with rising interest rates in the process of interest rate
deregulation, would worsen the indebtedness of firms and hence bring about
difficulties in the financial sector. An accumulation of external debt would
be less problematic, unlike the mid-1980s, consiVering the substantial amount
of foreign assets.
18 Although the tax rates on land ownership and on capital gains from
land are substantially high, the effective tax rates are low since the tax
assessed values of land amount to only a fraction of market values.
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1.72 In the EMP, GNP growth is targeted at 7 percent, 1.4 percentage
points lower than in 1991. (See Table 1.16.) Private consumption growth is
targeted at 8 percent, 1.2 percentage points lower than in 1991. The EMP
envisages a substantial deceleration in investment, especially in construction
investment. While equipment investment growth is targeted at 11 percent,
construction investment growth is targeted at a mere 2.5 percent in sharp
contrast to 11.2 percent last year. The EMP expects a modest pickup in
exports in combination with a substantial slowdown in import growth.
Merchandise export growth is targeted at 12 percent whereas merchandise import
growth is targeted at 9.8 percent, 8 percentage points lower than in 1991.
Accordingly, the current account balance target of $8 billion is a slight
improvement over last year's. Consumer price inflation is targeted at 7-8
percent, still high by recent Korean standards.
1.73 Developments in the first half have shown signs of cooling off, as
envisaged in the EMP. The growth rate of GNP was 6.7 percent compared with
the first half in 1991. While private consumption growth remained still high
at 7.8 percent, the growth rate of equipment investment declined sharply to
6.4 percent, and furthermore, construction investment recorded no growth at
all. Merchandise exports increased by a robust 12.3 percent whereas
merchandise import growth was contained at 6.4 percent. Accordingly, the
current account balance showed a slight improvement, registering a deficit of
$4.1 billion. The CPI inflation rate decelerated somewhat to 7.8 percent on
an annualized basis.
1.74 Although developments in the first half turned out to be mostly in
line with the EMP targets, there exist two main risks which could hamper
achieving the targets for the whole year. For one, the public expenditure
growth of 12.8 percent targeted for 1992 would seem to be on the high side,
especially considering the likelihood of a supplementary budget later in this
year as election time rolls around. For another, the M2 growth target of 18.5
percent would seem to be also high; in fact the BOK recommends 15-18 percent
M2 growth.14 However, the government rationalizes it arguing that this M2
growth rate is necessary to prevent a rapid rise in interest rates in the
process of interest rate deregulation and to offset the difficulties of
corporate financing in light of the depressed stock market.
14 A simple quantity equation shows that if the velocity of money remains
unchanged, the growth rate of money supply is equal to the sum of GNP growth
rate and inflation rate. M2 growth target. i'3 18.5 percent, substantially
higher than the sum of GNP growth target (7 percent) and GNP deflator target
(7 percent).
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Table 1.16: Macroeconomic Projections for 1992
Target 1st Half
1990 1991 1992 1992 a/
(Growth rates, 2)
Real GNP 9.3 8.4 7.0 6.7
Consumption 10.1 9.2 7.9 7.9
Private 10.3 9.2 8.0 7.8
Government 8.9 9.2 7.2 9.1
Fixed capital formation 24.0 11.9 5.8 2.9
Equipment 18.4 12.8 11.0 6.4
Construction 29.1 11.2 2.5 0.0
Merchandise exports 4.6 9.5 12.0 12.3
Merchandise imports 13.2 17.8 9.8 6.4
(in $ billion)
Current account balance -2.2 -8.8 -8.0 -4.1
Trade balance -2.0 -7.1 -7.0 -2.8
Exports 63.1 69.5 78.8 36.4
Imports 65.1 76.6 85.8 39.3
Invisible trade balance
and net transfer -0.2 -1.8 -1.0 -1.3
Rate of inflation (2)
GNP deflator 10.6 10.9 7.0 n.a.
Wholesale prices b/ 7.4 3.1 4.5 3.3 c/
Consumer prices b/ 9.4 9.5 7.0-8.0 7.8 cl
a/ Compared with the first half of 1991.
b/ End-year to end-year.
c/ Annualized.
Sources: Economic Planning Board; Bank of Korea.
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Medium Term Prospects
1.75 Korea's medium term development targets are outlined in the Seventh
Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan. The Seventh Plan is
considered an "indicative" plan, namely, its role is to provide information
and guidance to the private sector. The Plan aims at laying a foundation for
Korea to become an industrialized country. In order to achieve this goal, the
Plan envisages four basic strategies: (i) strengthening industrial
competitiveness, (ii) improving social welfare and equity, (iii) promoting
liberalization and internationalization; and (iv) encouraging private sector
initiatives. First, the government plans to stiLulate the growth potential of
the private sector by encouraging technological and managerial innovation. It
will also increase expenditures for social infrastructure, expand industrial
sites as well as implement measures to upgrade the quality of labor and to
ease labor shortages. Second, the government hopes to enhance the living
standards and achieve greater socio-economic equity, among others, by making
housing more accessible, expanding social welfare services, and improving
labor-management relations. Third, the government is committed to further
liberalize the economy, especially in the agricultural and financial sectors,
with a view to improving competitiveness. Fourth, to promote greater
competition and innovation among businesses, the government will simplify and
deregulate administrative procedures and devise plans to ease economic
concentration.
1.76 According to the Plan, GNP growth is targeted at an annual average
rate of 7.5 percent during 1992-96, and by 1996 per capita GNP is projected to
reach above $10,000. (See Table 1.17.) Private consumption growth is targeted
at 7 percent, slightly lower tnan GNP growth rate, whereas the investment
growth is projected at 8.3 percent. The current account balance is projected
to improve gradually toward a surplus of around 1 percent of GNP by 1996 as
exports growth is projected at 12-14 percent while 10-12 percent growth is
projected for imports. Consumer price inflation is projected at around 6
percent. Reflecting the government's concern on an erosion of manufacturing
industries, the share of manufacturing in GNP is targeted to increase to 30.7
percent by 1996 compared with 28.7 percent in 1991. Also, employment in
manufacturing is targeted to grow at 3.4 Dercent compared with 2.2 percent
growth for total employment. In turn, government expenditure on
infrastructure, education, social development, science and technology, and
environment is targeted to increase to 10.4 percent of GNP by 1996 from 6.4
percent of in 1990. Tax revenue is projected to increase to around 22 percent
of GNP by 1996 from current 19.5 percent.
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1986 1991 1996 1987-91 1992-96
Current GNP ($billion) 103 273 493 21.5 12.5
Per capita GNP ($) 2505 6316 10908 20.3 11.5
GNP growth (Z) 12.9 8.4 7.2 10.0 7.5
Private consumption growth (Z) 8.1 9.2 6.8 9.6 7.0
Fixed investment growth (Z) 12.0 11.9 7.5 16.9 8.3
Merchandise exports growth (Z) 26.1 9.8 8.9 9.1 9.0
Exports ($billion) a/ 34.7 71.9 130-140 15.6 12-14
Imports ($billion) a/ 31.6 81.5 130-140 20.7 10-12
Current account balance ($billion) 4.6 -8.8 5-7
(Z of GNP) (4.5) (-3.1) (around 1)
Consumer price inflation (Z) b/ 1.4 9.5 around 5 7.4 around 6
Wholesale price inflation (Z) -2.6 3.1 2-3 3.3 2-3
Manufacturing in GNP (Z) c/ 31.7 28.7 30.7 10.5 9.8
Total employment (thousands) 15505 18505 20637 3.6 2.2
Manufacturing employment('000) 3826 5048 5975 5.8 3.4
(Z of total) (24.7) (27.3) (29.0)
Unemployment rate (Z) 3.8 2.4 2.4 -- -
a/ Customs clearance base.
b/ End-year to end-year.
c/ In constant prices.
Source: Economic Planning Board.
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B. meraing Issues
It is widely believed that the Korean economy will r.ot face serious
difficulties in achieving the macroeconomic targets per se, barring major
external shocks. Rather, the real challenge is whether Korea will be able to
make a successful transition to join the ranks of industrialized countries by
the end of this century, as the Korean government envisages. This will depend
on how successfully Korea can resolve a number of problems of which the most
important aret (i) labor shortages, (ii) financial sector liberalization,
(iii) industrial restructuring, (iv) North-South Korea economic cooperation;
and (v) environmental concerns.
Labor Shortages
1.78 Korean firms, especially in small and medium manufacturing, have
been suffering from labor shortages, high wage increases notwithstanding.
According to a Ministry of Labor survey, the labor shortage ratio jumped from
1.8 percent in 1985 to 3.5 percent in 1988 and continued to increase rapidly
to 5.5 percent in 1991. (See Table 1.18.) The labor shortage situation is
most serious for production workers; the labor shortage ratio, defined as the
ratio of unfilled vacancies to current employees, accelerated to 9.1 percent
from 2.4 percent during 1985-91. Of production workers, the labor shortage
problem is most conspicuous for unskilled workers; the shortage ratio was
reportedly 20.1 percent in 1991. In terms of type of industry, apparel and
leather industries, which provide the least desirable workplace environment,
are suffering severely from labor shortages. This labor shortage situation
has been placing another burden on the eroding industrial competitiveness.15
1.79 The current situation of labor shortages is due partly to
overheated demand, but more fundamentally to long-term structural changes on
the supply side. The economically active population increased at an average
rate of 2.5 percent between 1980 and 1991, compared with the average rate of
3.7 percent between 1971 and 1980. There are two major reasons for this
development, in addition to the successful family planning which has steadily
reduced the birth rate since the early 1960s from around 3 percent to less
than 1 percent currently. First, the rural sector is now left with an aged
population as migration to the urban sector has progressed. Second, expansion
of education, especially at the secondary level, has reduced the supply of
young workers, as seen in Grsph 1.4. In fact, the labor participation rate
for male of ages between 15-19 years old significantly dropped from 41.2
percent in 1970 to 22.9 percent in 1980 and further to 10.7 percent in 1990.
Similarly, the labor participation rate for female of ages between 15-19 years
old rapidly declined from 38.7 percent in 1970 to 29.0 percent in 1980 and
further to 18.6 percent in 1990. In addition to these overall factors, several
mismatch problems aggravated the situations (i) as income levels rise, young
1C It is difficult to estimate the impact of labor shortages on the
economy. According to a recent study by the Korea Institute of Labor,
however, production lost due to labor shortage was estimated at 7.6 percent of
GDP.
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workers avoid manufacturing jobs preferring service sector jobs. (ii) Korean
youngsters have become "over-educated' relative to the available jobs,
especially 'or junior college and college graduates;1 and (iii) also, while
the supply of technical high school graduates is much smaller than demand, the
situation for liberal arts school graduates is the opposite.
Table 1.18: Labor Shortage Ratios a/
()
1985 1988 1989 1990 1991
(By type of workers)
Total employees 1.8 3.5 3.2 4.3 5.5
Of which:
office workers 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.3
Production workers 2.4 5.2 4.9 6.9 9.1
Of which:
Skilled 2.0 3.9 3.6 5.3 7.3
Unskilled 4.9 12.3 11.8 16.2 20.1
(By industry, production workers)
Metal mining 
-- -- 4.3 5.2 16.3
Apparel 
-- -- 9.7 15.0 18.1
Leather 
-- -- 6.3 22.7 14.9
Furniture 
-- -- 9.7 8.4 15.5
Rubber 
-- -- 4.7 4.9 10.4
Fabricated metal 
-- -- 6.6 7.6 10.9
Machinery 
-- -- 7.0 8.4 11.1
a/ Labor shortage ratio = unfilled vacancies / current employees.
Source: Ministry of Labor.
1.80 Efforts have been made to bring more women, particularly married
women, into the labor force. Although the labor force participation rate of
women increased from 38.5 percent to 47.5 percent between 1970 and 1991 thanks
to a substantial increase in the participation rate for women between the ages
16 In 1991, the unemployment rate for junior college and college
graduates was 3.7 percent whereas unemployment rate for workers with less than
junior high school education was 1.1 percent.
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of 35 and 54, it is far from satisfactory compared with 74 percent
participation rate for men and the government aims to increase it up to 50
percent by 1996. For this purpose, the government introduced the Equal
Employment Act in 1988 and plans to increase the number of nurseries from
current 700 to 2000 by 1995. including providing tax incentives for companies
operating nurseries. In turn, the pool of older workers, especially aged 55
and older, will rise substantially during the next decade. While the average
growth rate of the population aged 55 to 64 was about 2.5 percent per year
during the past two decades, it is expected to rise to around 3.5 percent
during the 1990s. However, due to involuntary retirement age at 55 and
insufficient part-time jobs, the aging labor force has not been fully
utilized.






















1971 1975 1980 985 1990
Yeor
0 ages between 15-19 + ages between 20-54 0 ages over 55
Source: National Statistical Office.
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1.81 The government intends to mobilize female, older and handicapped
labor (more than 2.4 million altogether) as part-time workers by revising
labor laws. In turn, it aims to increase the share of technical high school
enrollments in total enrollments from the cu:rent 32 percent to 50 percent in
the next three years. The government is very cautious in increasing foreign
workers, fearing possible undesirable social repercussions. In this regard,
economic cooperation with North Korea could be even more appealing due to the
homogeneity of workers. The authorities are considering a gradual increase of
foreign workers, raising the limit to 200,000 from the current 50,000
(including illegals). On the other hand, the government continues to
encourage investments in labor-saving technology; in fact, the employment
elasticity with respect to output in manufacturing declined to 0.25 during
1989-91 from 0.65 during 1986-88, due to a sharp increase in automation
investment at an annual rate of 53 percent in current prices during 1987-90.
Financial Sector Liberalization
1.82 The financial health of commercial banks, one of the main
preconditions for successful interest rate liberalization, has improved
significantly since 1987. Substantial capital increases were made during the
stock market boom. The amount of capital of commercial banks almost tripled
from 2.1 trillion won in 1987 to 6.2 trillion won in 1990. (See Table 1.19.)
Also noteworthy is that the non-performing loans, which was a serious concern
in mid 1980s in the aftermath of overseas construction and shipping industries
bailouts, steadily decreased since 1987. In terms of the share of total
loans, non-performing loans decreased sharply from around 10 percent in 1984-
86 to 2.1 percent in 1990.17 This has been made possible by the favorable
economic conditions of recent years and also in part by exposing long covered-
up non-performing loans and thus writing off some of them. The profitability
of commercial banks also improved; for instance, the ratio of net profits to
total assets increased steadily from 0.20 percent to 0.63 percent between 1987
and 1990.18 This improvement has been due to a decline in non-performing
loans and also to an increase in income from securities holdings and incomes
from trust and credit card businesses. Also improved was the productivity in
banking business; for example, value-added per employee increased steadily
from 14.8 million won in 1985 to 34.5 million won in 1990. Other productivity
indicators such as deposits per employee, lending per employee, and profits
per employee showed a similar pattern.
1.83 The improving financial health of the commercial banking system has
encouraged government to reduce barriers to entry. Currently, there are 23
17 Of course, the size of non-performing loans varies depending on the
definition. Here, the Office of Bank Supervision and Examination data are
used. They represent the part of total credits extended to those firms with
bad credit standing, which is not covered by secured coilaterals.
18 However, the profitability of domestic banks is still about half that
of foreign banks due to, among others, mandatory policy loans. It is also
noteworthy that the profitability of regional banks, which are under less
regulations, is substantially hi,her than that of nationwide banks.
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commercial banks (13 nationwide banks and 10 regional banks) compared with
only 5 commercial banks in the early 19809. In October 1991, two groups of
merged short-term finance companies chose an option of converting to a bank
rather than another option of converting to a securities company. Another
commercial bank backed by labor unions is to be established in the second half
of 1992. The situation has been similar for the branches of foreign banks.
For example, the Citibank has increased branches from 2 to 8, and plans to
increase further to 25 in next few years. However, it should be noted that
the increase in the number of the banks has not been due to the relaxation in
the requirements for establishing a bank. Rather, it has been due to more
open attitude of the government.
Table 1.19: Financial Indicators of Commercial Banks a/
1985 1987 1988 1989 1990
Paid-in capital (billion won) 943 2104 3340 5407 6158
Non-performing loans n.a. 3049 2979 2205 1910
(billion won)
(in Z of to*al loans) -- 5.4 5.0 3.1 2.1
Gross profits / total assets (Z) 0.87 0.68 0.96 1.41 1.24
Net profits / total assets (X) 0.19 0.20 0.37 0.58 0.63
Productivity indicators (million won)
Deposits per employee 336 496 664 754 857
Lending per employee 345 491 513 569 677
Gross profits per employee 5.2 5.5 9.8 16.4 17.1
Value-added per employee 14.8 16.2 21.9 32.7 34.5
a/ For 11 nationwide banks plus 10 regional banks. One special bank was
converted a commercial bank in 1987 and threi small-size commercial banks
were established in 1989.
Source: Office of Bank Supervision and Examination, Bank Management
Statistics, 1991.
1.84 On the other hand, the issue of policy loans will need to be
evaluated carefully for the effective financial liberalization. Since the
early 19608, the government has tried to ensure adequate funding for
"strategic sectors", such as export and heavy and chemical industries, by
providing loans with preferential interest rates. The share of loans to these
strategic sectors, however, declined sharply since the early 1980s. For
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example, export financing, which has received the mos' :vorable treatment in
terms of short-term operating funds and also in terms ., foreign currency
loans for imports of machinery and equipment by the exp rt sector, dropped
sharply between 1980 and 1985, as shown in Table 1.20. The share of the
National Investment Fund, which mainly has financed the investment in heavy
and chemical industries, also declined during 1980s. In turn, the government
has increased policy loans for welfare-related sectors, such as housing, and
less privileged sectors, such as agriculture and fisheries. Accordingly,
although the share of policy loans extended by the banking sector in total
domestic credit decreased from 49 percent to 39 percent between 1980 and 1985,
since then it increased back to the 46 percent level. Interest rate
differentials between policy loans and general loans are not expected to
shrink for the time being, since the deregulation of lending rates of policy
loans is scheduled only in the third phase (1994-96) of the interest rate
deregulation plan.
Table 1.20: Policy Loans Extended by Banks
1980 1985 1988 1989 1990
Total policy loans (billion won) 8239 16736 29763 36702 44850
(Z in total domestic credit) (49.1) (39.3) (46.4) (46.4) (46.3)
Of which (Z in total policy loans):
Government Fund 6.1 8.9 7.8 8.1 7.8
National Investment Fund 4.9 5.8 3.6 2.9 2.3
Credit to KDB, KEXIM, and KLTCB 3.0 2.4 17.0 17.1 16.7
Foreign currency loans 31.5 19.7 19.1 17.6 18.4
Foreign trade financing 20.9 18.7 4.0 3.8 4.3
Loans for agriculture and 5.1 6.6 7.9 7.2 7.3
fisheries
Housing loans 11.4 15.1 12.8 14.3 15.0
Source: National Statistical Office, Korean Economic Indicators, 1991.
1.85 Another concern is the insufficient supervision system to ensure
financial discipline. It should be pointed out that while financial sector
liberalization is expected to bring about long-term efficiency gains through
better resource allocation, without a proper supervision it may cause a
serious adverse selection problem (i.e., lending to projects with higher
risks), since commercial banks are not yet capable of making loans based on
credit analysis, as opposed to collateral. In this regard, the Office of Bank
Supervision and Examination (OBS) introduced a more systematic framework of
annual bank management evaluation since 1990. According to this system, the
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OBS evaluates all the commercial banks based on more transparent performance
indicators such as profitability, stability, and liquidity and gives ratings
of MA, A, B, and C, which are announced to the public. In addition, the OBS
plans to introduce the BIS type capital adequacy ratios, differentiated by
type of loans, by the end of 1993.
1.86 In sum, for successful financial sector liberalization efforts
should be made in, among others, the following areas: (i) promoting open
market operations, (ii) carefully evaluating the issue of policy loans, (iii)
establishing systematic bank supervision and prudential regulations; and (iv)
ensuring financial discipline by making loans based on rigorous credit
analysis. Recently, the Korean government requested the Bank to provide
technical assistance in preparing a blueprint for the financial sector
deregulation and market opening, which is to be completed by December 1992 and
will be the basis for carrying out further policy changes to liberalize the
financial sector. The Bank study will cover the following subjects: (i)
interest rate deregulation and credit allocation system, (ii) foreign exchange
and capital account transaction liberalization, (iii) opening of the bond
market to foreign portfolio investment; and (iv) money market development.
Industrial Restructuring
1.87 The Korean economy has been unde.going significant industrial
restructuring. One distinctive trend is the declining light industry. The
share of light industry in total manufacturing production decreased to an
average of 38 percent during 1988-91 from the average of 43 percent during
1985-87. The share of light industry in total manufacturing exports similarly
decreased to an average of 44 percent during 1988-90, 3 percentage points
lower than the average during 1985-87. As the economy accumulates capital and
makes technological innovation, the share of labor-intensive light industry
declines. For example, the share of light industry shrank from two thirds to
one half between 1960 and 1980 as Korea accumulated capital and technology.
During the recent years, however, high wage increases not accompanied by the
corresponding productivity increases, in combination with frequent labor
disputes, accelerated the industrial transformation away from the labor-
intensive light industry.
1.88 Although the recent trend is not totally negative since it could
facilitate the industrial restructuring effectively, away from the less
efficient "sunset' industries and towards the higher value-added "sunrise"
industries, efforts should be made to help the transformation be smoother.
For one, the social safety net will need to be stronghold for the workers in
the declining labor-intensive industries and also the mobility of labor should
be enhanced through, among others, training. For another, importing more low-
wage guest workers could be considered and also more offshore operations
should be pursued. In fact, Korea's DFI in the labor-intensive manufacturing
sector increased sharply since 1989, especially in low-wage Southeast Asian
countries.
1.89 In turn, enhancing productivity will be the key for the successful
industrial restructuring. In this regard, one of the crucial elements is
technology development. Korea made significant progress in promoting
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technology development during the 1980s, as indicated by the fact that Korea's
R&D expenditure increased sharply, more than ten-fold. As a proportion of
GNP, it tripled from 0.6 percent to 1.9 percent. (See Table 1.21.) The
current R&D expenditure / GNP ratio is much higher than the current ratio in
Taiwan, China or the ratio in Japan during 1970-75.19 There has been
similar progress in terms of technology manpower; for example, the number of
researchers in technology development per 10,000 persons increased sharply
from 5 to 16. Nevertheless, Korean firms are concerned about difficulties in
domestic technology development. (In recent business surveys, Korean firms
consistently reported that difficulties in technology upgrading is one of the
most serious obstacles to industrial competitiveness.) They also complain
that industrialized countries have become more reluctant to transfer
technology.
Table 1.21: Development of R&D Expenditure / GNP Ratios
(Z)
Korea Taiwan Japan U.S. Germany
(West)
1970 0.39 -- 1.59 2.57 2.19
1975 0.42 -- 1.72 2.20 2.39
1980 0.58 0.71 1.91 2.29 2.63
1985 1.48 1.01 2.49 2.83 2.77
1986 1.68 0.98 2.48 2.84 2.78
1987 1.77 1.12 2.53 2.82 2.88
1988 1.86 1.22 2.58 2.77 2.86
1989 1.91 -- 2.69 2.73 2.89
1990 1.91 -- -- 2.74 --
1996 (target) 3 - 4
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Science and Technology Yearbook,
1992.
19 It' is argued that the Korean economy lags behind the Japanese economy
by around 15 years. (For example, see "Korea's Export Niche: Origins and
Prospects, by P. Petri, World Development (Vol. 16, No.1, 1988.)
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1.90 Accordingly, the Korean government has identified technology
development as one of the top priorities in the Seventh Five-Year Plan. It
aims to mobilize one trillion won in a science and technology development fund
and to increase the science and technology budget from the current 3 percent
of the total budget to 4-5 percent by 1996, in an effort to boost the R&D
expenditure to GNP ratio up to 3-4 percent by 1996. This R&D expenditure
target, which surpasses the current level of the U.S. or Japan, seems to be a
rather ambitious one. It should be also noted that improving the quality of
R&D expenditure would be equally important. In fact, this issue of quality of
R&D expenditure could answer the discrepancy between the Korean perception of
difficulties in technology upgrading and the recent high level of R&D
expenditure. The government also plans to expand the enrollment of college
graduates majoring in science and technology by 4,000 every year during 1992-
96 and aims to increase the number of technology development manpower to 26
per 10,000 persons by 1996 from current 16. In addition, it plans to
strengthen tax and financial incentives for technology development of the
private sector, which currently finances 84 percent of total R&D expenditure,
with a view to raising the current ratio of R&D investment to total sales in
manufacturing from 2.1 percent toward, for example, 3.3 percent in Japan.
1.91 Anothe'r element for enhancing priductivity is the availability and
efficiency of capital. Although the recent surge in private consumption and
construction investment did not seem to crowd out equipment investment much, a
continuing surge could deplete capital for equipment investment, and thereby
hamper productivity enhancement. On the other hand, the ongoing financial
sector liberalization would contribute to productivity enhancement by
increasing the mobility and efficiency of the capital market more generally.
North-South Korea Economic Cooperation
1.92 Relations between North and South Korea have improved recently, a
development which raises the prospect of economic cooperation and perhaps even
economic integration in the foreseeable future. Economic cooperation between
North and South Korea should be mutually beneficial given the complementary
nature of two economies; while N. Korea is abundant in labor and natural
resources, S. Korea has capital and technology. Economic integration would
help S. Korea solve its labor shortage problem, benefit from a bigger market,
and could reduce transportation costs through land access to Europe. Economic
exchange began in the form of indirect trade in October 1988 and accelerated
in 1991, including some direct trade, as the mood of reconciliation has risen
in the wake of joining the U.N., albeit separately, in October 1991. The
optimistic mood for speedy N-S Korea economic cooperation escalated further
when the two authorities signed an accord on reconciliation, nonaggression,
exchanges, and cooperation in December 1991. Since then, however, the mood has
abruptly turned around due to the issue of nuclear inspection.
1.93 During the period between October 1988 and December 1991,
N. Korea's exports to S. Korea amounted to $137 million while N. Korea's
imports from S. Korea amounted to only $7 million. More than 70 percent of
the trades happened in 1991. All but three transactions took the form of
indirect *rade, mainly through Hong Kong. Of N. Korea's export items to
S. Korea, primary and intermediate products dominated; 55 percent for primary
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iron and metal such as zinc, 14 percent for other mineral products, 14 percent
for fishery products, and 12 percent for agricultural products. Of S. Korea's
export items to N. Korea, 44 percent were chemical products and 31 percent
were textile products.
1.94 North Korean Economy. In order to gauge potential benefits from
further economic cooperation with N. Korea, it is essential to understand the
status of North Korean economy. Research on the N. Korean economy has been
limited due to lack of availability of reliable economic data. Recently,
since 1990 the National Unification Board (NUB) has been publishing annual
report on N. Korean economy, with estimates of major economic indicators based
on various N. Korean government publications. However, it should be
emphesized that economic data on N. Korea are considered "guesstimate" at
best, and accordingly should be interpreted with extreme caution. According
to the NUB report, estimated GNP of N. Korea in 1990 was $23 billion, about
one tenth of GNP of S. Knrea. (See Table 1.22.) Per capita GNP was estimated
at $1064, about one fifth of S. Korea's, as N. Korea's population was
estimated at 21.7 million, about half of population in S. Korea.20 In terms
of industrial structure, the share of agriculture was estimated at 27 percent,
mining and manufacturing at 43 percent, a.ad social infrastructure and services
at 30 percent. Compared with S. Korea, the shares of agriculture and mining
and manufacturing are much larger, whereas social infrastructure and services
are much less developed. Of manufacturing,-about 80 percent is heavy and
chemical industries compared with 60 percent in S. Korea. Among agricultural
products, maize is the main crop while rice production is about one third of
S. Korea's. N. Korea is abundant with natural resources such as coal and iron
ore. N. Korea's manufacturing production is lagging far behind, especially in
consumer goods such as textile and refrigerators. All in all, it can be
argued that the N. Korean economy is lagging behind the S. Korean economy by
15-20 years based on indicators such as population growth rate, agricultural
population share, and per capita GNP.
1.95 In order to estimate costs and benefits of economic cooperation
with N. Korea, it is imperative to evaluate the N. Korean economy as
rigorously as possible. Although the data on N. Korean economy are very
limited and unreliable, efforts should be made to estimate reasonable
'ballpark' figures, possibly with the help of UNDP which maintains a
representative office in Pyongyang, by utilizing the experiences of similar
tasks on socialist countries such as Viet Nam. It will be helpful to select
promising joint venture projects based on a thorough analysis of comparative
advantages. In addition, it will be necessary to analyze the German
experience in economic cooperation to draw lessons to be applicable to the
20 Of course, per capita GNP estimate varies depending on assumptions for
estimates. For example, while official North Korean figure was $2530 for
1988, estimates by the Her'tage FoundaLton was $930 for 1989 and estimates by
the International Institute for Economic and Political Studies in former USSR
was $408 for 1989. Recently, the KDI used physical indicators like steel,
energy, etc. as explanatory variables for per capita GNP, utilizing regression
results for other socialist countries, and obtained a per capita income
estimates of $1268 for 1990.
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TabLe 1.22: Major Economic Indicators of South and North Korea
(as of 1990)
.............................. .................................................................... ........... ............. ...............................
South Korea North Korea North / South (X)
...........................................................................................................
Population (milLion) 42.8 21.7 51
(growth rate) (0.97) (1.61) -
Area (thousand square km) 99.3 122.1 123
GNP (S billion) 238 23 10
Per capita GNP Cs) 5569 1064 19
Goverrunent budget / GNP CX) 16.3 71.9
Military expenditure / GNP (X) 4.1 21.5
(X of GNP)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 9.0 26.8 --
Mining and manufacturing 29.5 42.8 --
Social infrastructure and services 61.5 30.4 -
AgricuLtural area (thousand ha) 2109 2141 102
Grain production (thousand ton) 6635 4812 73
(of which: rice) (5606) (1932) 34
Agricutural population (X of totalj 15.1 37.8
Coal production (million ton) 17.2 43.3 252
Electricity generation (billion kwh) 107.7 27.7 26
Iron ore production (thousand ton) 298 10300 3456
Iron and steel production (million ton) 25.4 5.9 23
Chemical fertilizer production (million ton) 4.0 3.5 88
Cement production (million ton) 42.1 12.0 29
Automobile production (thousands) 1902 33 2
Ship production (thousand G/T) 3422 214 6
Textile production (thousand ton) 1800 176.8 10
TV set production (thousand) 14500 240 2
Refrigerator production (thousand) 4700 126 3
Railroad (km) 6435 5045 78
Road (km) 56715 23000 41
(of which: paved) (40545) (1717) 4
Port capacity (million ton per year) 224.3 34.9 16
Total foreign trade (S billion) 134.9 4.6 3
Exports (S billion) 65.0 2.0 3
Imprts (S billion) 69.8 2.6 4
External debt (S billion) 31.7 7.9 25
.Source ............... Uniicao ................N a .. ............n oard, r ofEconomi9._
Source: Natfonel Unifficatfon Board, Comorfson of Econmomie of South *nd Worth Korea, 1991.
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Korean case. It will be also useful to study the working of export processing
zones in socialist countries such as China. Also useful is a research on
institutional and legal matters to facilitate the economic cooperation
effectively.
Environment
1.96 Despite Korea's remarkable success in sustaining rapid economic
growth, there is concern that some of this prosperity has been illusory. Some
analysts have argued that Korea has sacrificed too much environmental quality
in the interests of economic growth. In this view, the government should have
implemented more aggressive policies for environmental protection at an
earlier stage of development. Others disagree with this thesis, maintaining
instead that if environmental concerns had been taken into account
prematurely, substantial losses in economic growth and welfare would have
resulted. Moreover, the emphasis placed on economic growth encouraged '
efficiency in resource use, thereby mitigating the pollution and resource
degradation that have resulted, in Eastern Europe for instance, from excessive
use of natural resources. A case in point was Kurea's success in reducing
energy intensity following the second oil shock in 1979. And Korea's economic
success has enabled it to invest the resources necessary to address
environmental problems such as urban sanitation and water supply.
1.97 It is difficult to evaluate this argument regarding the efficacy of
Korea's past environmental stance because, as elsewhere in the developing
world, most environmental data are available only for the 1980s. However, it
is true that environmental issues were not emphasized by the government until
the late 1970s. Industrial pollution control was adopted as a major
development objective only in the Fourth Five Year Plan (1977-81). But since
the late-1970s, several policies have been introduced for environmental
protection and environmental institutions have been strengthened. The
Environmental Preservation Act was enacted in 1977. The Office of
Environmental Administration was established in 1980, and was expanded in 1990
to the Ministry of Environment (hOE). Several environmental measures were
adopted during the 1980s. An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) system was
implemented in 1982. All large projects in environmentally-sensitive areas
are now subject to EIAs, which analyze their environmental impacts and
recommend changes in order to mitigate serious adverse impacts. Since 1983, a
pollution charge system has been in place to reduce industrial pollution. It
allows the government to impose fines against enterprises that violate the
Environmental Preservation Act. Finally, the Pollution Prevention Fund was
created to encourage businesses to reduce pollution. The fund provides long-
term loans to businesses at low interest rates for pollution control
investments.
1.98 Trends during the 1980s in some indicators of environmental quality
are shown in Table 1.23. These data show improvements for many air and water
pollutants. In Seoul, for instance, concentrations of sulfur dioxide have
fallen to half their 1980 levels while total suspended particulates (TSP) have
shown a similar decrease since 1985. Stringent controls on the use of high-
sulfur oil, the mandatory use of liquified natural gas in new buildings, and
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Table 1.23: Envirortental Quality Indicators
1. Air quality




Seoul 0.094 0.056 0.051
Pusan 0.058 0.047 0.039
Taegu 0.038 0.039 0.041
Kwangju 0.009 0.020 0.017
Ulsan 0.053 0.030 0.031
Concentration of other air pollutants in Seoul 1985 1990
Nitro dioxide (ppm) 0.034 0.029
Oxidant (ppm) 0.019 0.008
Carbon monoxide(ppm) 2.7 2.7
Hydro carbon (ppm) 4.3 3.0
Total Suspended Particulates (ug/m3) 216 131











Han River 5.2 3.6 3.4
Youngsan River 3.8 5.2 6.7
Nakdong River 3.6 3.6 3.0
Keuw River 2.0 3.0 3.1






3. Solfd waste 1984 1987 1990
.... 
.... . .... 
.. ..
Domestic solid waste (ton/day) 54347 67031 83962
Industrial solid waste (ton/day) n.a. 40307 61411
4. Noise
Noiee level In Seout (Leq dB (A)) 1985 1990
Roadside area average (day) 60 64
General area average (day) 75 77
...........................................................................................................
Soxurce: MinIstry of EnvIronment, Korea E m ironmental Yearbook, 19W91.
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the expansion of district heating systems contributed to these improvements.
Water quality (as measured by biological oxygen demand loads) has also
improved on two of the four major rivers, especially the Han River, as new
treatment plants were constructed.
1.99 Despite these improvements, air and water quality remain areas of
concern. Sulfur dioxide and TSP concentrations still reach unhealthy levels
in Seoul and other cities, especially during the winter. For example,
according to the WHO standards, the sulfur dioxide level should not exceed
0.05 ppm for more than seven days a year. The quality of air in Seoul,
however, reportedly exceeded this level for 87 days in 1991. And as the use
of private automobiles continues to grow, levels of nitrogen oxides and
hydrocarbons are also rising rapidly, particularly in Seoul. The treatment of
household and industrial wastewater remains low--only about 30 percent in
1990--and is the main source of pollution of rivers and coastal waters.21
Although three of four major rivers still reportedly maintain a second-class
water quality (which is drinkable), the Youngsan River is rated a third-
class. With growing affluence and industrial growth, solid waste generation
is increasing rapidly both from household and industrial sources. Almost all
this waste is disposed in open dumps with attendant ill-effects on health and
amenity. And as the sophistication of the industrial sector grows, At can be
expected that the generation of hazardous solid wastes will also increase.
1.100 Problems also arise in implementing environmental policies
effectively. On the institutional side, the administration of environmental
laws and regulations is fragmented because fifteen ministries and offices of
the centra'l government are involved in addition to MOE and local authorities.
And while MOE is responsible for enforcing laws regarding discharges.of
industrial firms, its officials lack the power to take offenders to court.
There are gaps also in the environmental policies that are in place. The
penalties on industrial enterprises for emissions in excess of the legal
limits are too low to encourage better compliance with the standards. The EIA
system, being project specific, often does not cover smaller projects even
when these involve a high risk of affecting the environment adversely.
1.101 As Korea progresses into the ranks of the high-income countries,
environmental protection will become an even more important policy objective.
This is alreAdy reflected in the priority that the Seventh Five Year Plan
places on improving environmental conditions. The challenge for the
government is to set realistic environmental goals, and design policies and
institutions that will allow these targets to be met at relatively low
economic cost. In this regard, Korea's experience during the 1980s and the
record of the United States, Japan and Western Europe in the last two decades
are encouraging. The environmental improvements in Korea since 1980, noted in
Table 1.24, have not required massive investments. It has also been possible
for many OECD countries, most notably Japan, to make significant environmental
improvements without sacrificing economic growth. Mowever, Korea is not as
affluent as Japan and the United States were in the 1970s when they began
21 The contamination of rivers is exemplified by the incident of massive
dumping of phenol into the Nakdong River in 1991.
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implementing stringent environmental regulations. Therefore, it is essential
that in attempting to improving environmental quality, Korean policymakers pay
close attention to the economic costs of various interventions as well as to
their anticipated environmental benefits. For this reason, further analysis
on environmental issues is considered a priority.
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Table A.1: Population and Enployment
......................................................... I....................................
Total populatfon Economically
Year (mid-year) active population Eoptoyed
C'000)
1970 32241 10062 9617
1980 38124 14431 13683
1985 40806 15592 14970
1988 41975 16870 16870
1989 42380 17511 17511
1990 42869 18036 18036
1991 43268 18576 18576
(Growth rate p.a., X)
1970-80 1.7 3.7 3.6
1980-85 1.4 1.6 1.8
1985-88 0.9 2.7 4.1
1989 1.0 3.8 3.8
1990 1.2 3.0 3.0
1991 0.9 3.0 3.0
Labor force participation rate Unemployment
Year Total Nate Female rate
tX)
1970 57.6 77.9 39.3 4.4
1980 59.0 76.4 42.8 5.2
1985 56.6 72.3 41.9 4.0
1988 58.5 72.9 45.0 2.5
1989 59.5 73.3 46.5 2.6
1990 60.0 73.9 47.0 2.4
1991 60.6 74.7 47.3 2.3
Source: National Statisical .ff.ice, Korea Sttistical Yearbook, 199.........................
Source: Natfonal Statisticat Office, Korea Statfetfcat Yearbook, 1991.
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Table A.2.1: Social Indicators
Sie rqgic 6 1coMe groiP
Mast Nei
25-30 15-20 recegt h r
UnLt of Yw yws estan. Ba s- u
^avawe ago °go (Owe) Asia inoe gO'P
HIUMAN RISOURCES
Sbr, gr.wtb dmvWre ofppqutad
Total ocilaoton(i,.90 ~illon 2&53 35.28 42.79 IF159 81714 ahdun=ndto Vi.pop. 43.2 37.7 25.7 29.5 33.8 19.6
15&4 53.5 58.6 69.4 65.2 60.9 67.2
ged6edencio ulit 0.87 0.71 0.44 0.53 0.63 0.49
lWenX8ein =mm % of pop. 32.4 48.0 72.0 51.0 71.8 78.3
Fanales per 100 utah
Urban number .. 100 101
Rl al.. 97 98
Pcawm anu aV .n 2.5 1.9 1.0 1.6 1.7 05
U6 i- 5.4 5.0 3.0 6.5 2.8 0.7
Utbuu rowhdiffa l diffac 43 5.9 6.9 10.2 3.6 0.5
Pri$eatadpopuladaua:2000 mlfjiat. ... 46.64 1.816 541 859
u pogmda .. .. 5643
Deteli"fpopMa*h powib
Chdbibh rat ertbo.L pop. 35.0 25.9 16.1 22.9 24.9 13.0
Totl lfedfilit tz bnhs per wan 4.87 3.32 1.80 2.66 3.10 1.72
.onuacqdv,pveem V owomen 15-49 .. 34.0 77.0 73.8
.ild (0.4)/ womn (15.49) rooUbian per 100 women .. 44 32
Ru .. 56 36
Ctudeah mw per thoL pop. 4 11.2 7A 6.2 6.9 7.5 8.8
InfanzmonaUtymt. per s.live buit 62.2 39.8 17.1 33.6 41.8 8.0
BndarS m o e ..Ga.e 21.0 66.9 49.8 13.0
Lifegpctul toverwml yars 567 63.9 702 68.6 68.3 76.7
fema.e 5a4 669 73.4 69.9 71.5 80.1
LJAbof.a.a(15.6
Total laborfe millions 9.68 13.05 1866 871 173 396
In ofSiaborforce 55.1 428
LA 23.3
Female 29.1 33.3 338 41.8 30.4 38.3
Panda per 100mae
Uwban number .. 103 102
Rura 97 94
Pastloip at. .oveai Sof labort foe 33.9 37.0 41.6 56.9 38.3 48.0
fmak 19.7 24.8 284 47.6 23.3 35.8
Eduesilomal EM" o lor tfame
Sdeool yea conplezed: oaver n .. ..
male
NATURAL RESOURCES
Area toL sq.km 99 99 99 15,572 18,709 32.125
km . b 288 356 428 100 24 25
lowisisand11bd qoflLndz=a 23.0 22.9 22.4 40.2 34.3 35.9Apiculturaldmalty pop. peraq.km ~~125 1.553 1.12 248 70 7
~'aaand woodland -P aqua 66 66 65 3.822 7,116 9.212
rare n(uc =a 0.4 0.0 40.1 .0.2 -0.5 0.2
Acem to ohe war V iOponp. .. 66.0 93.0 67.3 80.0
Urban .. 95.0 76.0 63.3 88.7
Rural .. 380 100.0 83.4 63.8
Population growth Infant mortality Primary school enrollment
* no _ n.-b
4 _S ¢S
a 40~~~~~~~~~~~~
G*dcb 01*76 1000a abnt4 O0*& OO7, M
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Table A.2.2: Social Indicators
Unk of25.e" YM Moiwt Same raiw iicneraaq, c
mm0 ao (we) Mu. ILcome group
INCOME AND POVERTY
Income
GNPpercapita (mm 1990) USS 130 580 5,400 590 3,450 19,660
Total household incaeShae to top 10% of bouseholds of uicome .. 28
Sharm to top 20% of households .. , . *-
Shame to botwa 40S of houeolds 
..
Shar to boacin 20% of households 
Povet7
Absoute poverty income: rban USS per pence .. ..
Pop. in absolute poverty: b opop.
Povalence of mal(unicn (underS) V of age group ..
EXPENDITURE
Food %ofGDP 32.1 21.7Staples 
.. 18.1 8.8
Meat, fGs, milk. chee, eggs * 5.6 6.6
Cereal Imports thou. metiic torne 649 3,124 9,087 30.956 39.280 68,753
vood ad m ccreRs * .. ~~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~234 451
rodu it& ~~~~197941 too 86. 89.0 107.3 132.5 106.0 101.6ShamP4f agultur DF` Of G=DP 38.0 24.5 9.0 19.7 9.0 2.6
Dailycaloe suppy caloiesperpeami 2,178 2,686 2,8S2 2.619 3.013 3.416
3S1y pmtea :53ky gntrasperpeason E6 75 78 62 77 105
housing % of GDP .. 5.6 6.5
Avere household size persons perhousehold 6 5Urban S S
Fixed investment housing % of GDP . 4.5 4.6
Fue and power % of GDP .. 33 2.8
Fcde cyp kg ofoil equiivaln 238.2 666.3 1,897.5 557.9 1.794.4 S.122.9
Urban % of households
Rural 
. ..
Transpoa and ommunkatoa % of GDP .. 4.9 5.6
Population ppeussgercar peos 1,750 332 38 319 11 2
TFRailerd lnetm h tanspo equipnet oGDP .. 5.4 32Toul ad ltope km e7 .. 55S78
Po lpertdephonc persons .. 25 4
INVWSTMENT IN UMAN CAPITAL
Medlcl care % of ODP .. 2i8 2.9
Populadon per physicia pau22 2,684 1,f155 1,029
nurse 2.97 1,190 58.2 1,29
hospitalbd .. 1,900 596 513
Acocss to heath cae % of pop.
hmunizd (under l2 maots): measlLs % of ate 8up - 758 62.9 78.2 73.8DP'T .. . 8. 70. 81.5 82.7
Orl Rehydration lleapyuse (winderS) % of ces .. .. .. 38.4
Educadon % of GDP .. 35 S.5.
Gross cnrlucmem atios
Primanay total V.of s"-a8egfoup 101.0 107.0 108.0 130.4 105.9 104.3fam-le "~~9.0 107.0 110.0 125.9 102.7
Secondary: total 33.0 56.0 87.0 46.9 56.3 91.6famae * 25.0 48.0 85.0 41 58.9 928
Tcary: senc/engecuing * of teftary smdmr 27.8 28.5 29.S
PuPl4earatio:r 2o 3 popls perteadner 62 52 36 21 25 1937 40 26 15
Pup sreachdng gmde 4 % Of cort 95.6 99.5 81.0 77.8 96.2
Repater:pn% of total an =ent 0.5 0.0 0.0 6S 17.6
Illentysawva Siepop"41)...t 24.1 15.1fem of1a wefd+ .. I t 34.0 17.7
NewspquerciwlEatiao pethous pop. 632 1703 1462 46.9 100.9 333.1
Source: World Bank, Social Indicators of Development, 1991-92
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Table A.3: GNP by Expenditure Category (Current Prices), 1986-91
....................... ................................................... w.............
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991p
........... ............................................................................................
(in billion won)
Consumption 61687 68697 78955 92082 110205 131927
Private consumption 52286 57988 66468 77017 91881 109449
Public consumption 9401 10709 12487 15065 18324 22478
Gross domestic investment 26486 31944 39211 47693 63817 81086
Fixed investment 25993 31131 37354 45259 62992 78765
Changes in stock 492 813 1857 2434 825 2321
Exports of goods and services 36034 45051 51101 48813 53468 60801
Imports of goods and services 30365 36356 40567 44785 54449 66167
Statistical discrepancy -415 -908 -738 -802 -318 -131
GDP 93426 108428 127963 143001 172724 207517
Net factor income -2827 -2404 -1732 -1207 -1236 -1490
GUP 90599 106024 126231 141794 171488 206027
(X of GNP)
Consumption 68.1 64.8 62.5 64.9 64.3 64.0
Private consumption 57.7 54.7 52.7 54.3 53.6 53.1
Public consumption 10.4 10.1 9.9 10.6 10.7 10.9
Gross domestic investment 29.2 30.1 31.1 33.6 37.2 39.4
Fixed investment 28.7 29.4 29.6 31.9 36.7 38.2
Changes in stock 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.7 0.5 1.1
Exports of goods and services 39.8 42.5 40.5 34.4 31.2 29.5
Imports of goods and services 33.5 34.3 32.1 31.6 31.8 32.1
Statistical discrepancy -0.5 -0.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1
GDP 103.1 102.3 101.4 100.9 100.7 100.7
Net factor income -3.1 -2.3 -1.4 -0.9 -0.7 -0.7
GNP ICO.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.4: GNP by Expenditure Category (1985 Constant Prices), 1986-91
............... .................................. ..................................................................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991p
(in billion won)
Consumption 60726 65657 72058 79797 87874 95967
Private consumption 51712 56020 61520 68235 75283 82220
Public onsumption 9014 9637 10538 11562 12591 13747
Gross domestic investment 26247 30893 35583 43008 50889 59020
Fixed Investment 25569 29800 33806 39528 49017 54853
Changes In stock 679 1093 1777 3480 1872 4167
Exports of goods and services 35239 42849 48209 46370 48319 53050
Inports of goods and services 31714 37871 42732 49683 56816 66722
Statistical discrepancy 370 277 374 986 1237 1276
GDP 90868 101804 113492 120477 131503 142591
Net factor income -2694 -2192 -1512 -901 -818 -989
GNP 88174 99612 111980 119577 130685 141602
(Rate of change, X)
Consumption 8.4 8.1 9.7 10.7 10.1 9.2
Private consumption 8.0 8.3 9.8 10.9 10.3 9.2
Public consumption 10.8 6.9 9.3 9.7 8.9 9.2
Gross domestic investment 10.9 17.7 15.2 20.9 18.3 16.0
Fixed investment 12.0 16.5 13.4 16.9 24.0 11.9
Exports of goods and services 26.1 21.6 12.5 -3.8 4.2 9.8
Imports of goods and services 17.8 19.4 12.8 16.3 14.4 17.4
GDP 12.4 12.0 11.5 6.2 9.2 8.4
GNP 12.9 13.0 12.4 6.8 9.3 8.4
. . . ............ ............................................................
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.5: GNP by Industrial Origin (Current Prices), 1986-91
............................................................................................................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991p
(in billion won)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 10729 11353 13494 14458 15584 16715
Mining and manufacturing 30483 35820 42545 45463 50683 57967
Of which:
Manufacturing 29579 34903 41621 44650 49895 57070
Electricity, gas, and water 2897 3197 3365 3463 3612 4257
Construction 6646 8069 10329 13931 22884 32056
Serv!ces (incLuding services of govermnent 42671 49989 58230 65686 79961 96522
and private non-profit Institutions)
GNP 90599 106024 126231 141794 171488 206027
(X of GNP)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 11.8 10.7 10.7 10.2 9.1 8.1
Mining and manufacturing 33.6 33.8 33.7 32.1 29.6 28.1
of which:
Manufacturing 32.6 32.9 33.0 31.5 29.1 27.7
Electricity, gas, and water 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 2.1
Construction 7.3 7.6 8.2 9.8 13.3 15.6
Services (including services of goverrnent 47.1 47.1 46.1 46.3 46.6 46.8
and private non-profit institutions)
GNP 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.6: GNP by Industrial OrIgin (1985 Constant Prices), 1986-91
,................... ,.................................... ......................................................... ,,.. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991p
, ........................................................................... .....................................................
(in billion won)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 10830 10098 10903 10780 10232 10147
Mining and manuiacturing 29874 35305 39926 41323 44911 48663
Of which:
Manufacturing 29018 34460 39089 40543 44216 47966
Electricity, gas, and water 2841 3190 3504 3880 4514 4887
Construction 6560 7394 8097 9397 11626 12938
Services (including services of government 40763 45817 51062 5!197 60220 65956
and private non-profit institutions)
GNP 88174 99612 111980 119577 130685 141602
(Rate of change, X)
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 4.6 -6.8 8.0 -1.1 -5.1 -0.8
Mining and manufacturing 18.0 18.2 13.1 '.5 8.7 8.4
Of which:
Manufacturing 18.3 18.8 13.4 3.7 9.1 8.5
Electricity, gas, and water 25.3 12.3 9.8 10.7 1S.3 8.3
Construction 5.0 12.7 9.5 16.1 23.7 11.3
Services (including services of goverment 11.2 12.4 11.4 7.9 9.3 9.5
and private non-profit institutions)
GNP 12.9 13.0 12.4 6.8 9.3 8.4
.......... .................... ........................................................
Source: Bank of Korea, Economfc Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.7: Balance of Payments
(USS million)
... ... ... .... ............... .. ......... ............................ ................................................ .. .... ...................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Current account balance 4617 9854 14161 5055 -2179 -8827
CX of GNP) (4.5) (7.6) (8.2) (2.4) (-0.9) (-3.1)
Trade balance 4206 7659 11445 4597 -2004 -7065
Exports 33913 46244 59648 61409 63124 69522
Imqorts 29707 38585 48203 56812 65127 76587
Invisible trade balance -628 977 1267 211 -451 -1615
Credit 8052 10010 11252 12642 14269 15469
Debit 8679 9033 9985 12431 14719 17085
Transfers (net) 1039 1218 1448 247 275 -147
Long-term capital (net) -1982 -5836 -2733 -3363 548 4349
Of which:
Loans and foreign investment 704 -1945 -18S! -1105 33 3019
Basic balance 2635 4018 11428 1692 -1632 -4478
Short-term capital (net) -392 -7 1336 60 3334 362
Errors and omissions -544 1191 -589 701 -1976 375
Overall balance 1670 5202 12175 2453 -274 -3740
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.8: Exports, Imports, and Terms of Trade ._a/
............................................................................... ..................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
............ .......................... ..........................................................................
Exports
Total amount (USS mit) 34715 47281 60696 62377 65016 71870
Quantity index (1985=100) 111.2 138.9 156.9 146.9 153.3 168.3
Unit value index (1985.100) 102.1 112.4 127.7 140.2 139.8 140.7
Imports
Total amount (USS mil) 31584 41020 51811 61465 69844 81525
Quantfty Index (1985=100) 108.1 130.7 149.4 173.6 196.6 229.5
Unit value index (1985=100) 93.8 100.8 111.4 113.7 114.1 114.1
Terms of trade (1985100) 108.8 111.5 114.6 123.3 122.5 123.3
..................................................................................................
_a/ Reference dates are based on the date When customs clearance was permitted.
Exports are valued at FOB and inports at CIF.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.9: External Debt Indicators -a/
. .......... ..... ......... ............... ................................. ...............
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
...... ............................................................................................................ ..............
Nominal stock of debt (USS bil) 46.7 39.8 35.7 32.8 34.0 39.3
Stock of debt deflated by:
(1985=100)
Export unit prices 45.7 35.4 28.0 23.4 24.3 27.9
Import unit prices 49.8 39.5 32.0 28.8 29.8 34.4
Debt service payments (USS bil) 11.2 18.2 10.5 8.8 8.3 n.a.
Debt service ratio (X) 26.7 32.3 14.8 11.8 10.7 n.a.
Debt I GNP ratio (X) 45.5 31.0 21.1 15.6 14.4 14.0
Debt / Exports ratio CX) 111.3 70.8 50.4 44.3 43.9 46.2
.................................................. ........................................................................................................
_a/ Discrepancies exist between the figures in the World Debt Tables and the Korean government figures.
For example, total external debt in 1990 was $31.7 billion according to the Korean authorities.
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables, for 1986-90;
Ministry of Finance, for 1991.
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TabLe A.10: Consolidated General Govermnent Revenues and Expenditures
(in billion won)
............................... .
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 _a/
....... ....... .............. <....................... . .. ....... .... ... .. ..
Current revenue 19403 23001 28110 33301 42073 45902
Current expenditure 13548 15167 17751 21608 26408 31064
Current balance 5855 7834 10359 11693 15665 14838
Capital revenue 321 315 618 925 1086 1291
Capital expenditure 4999 5544 6600 8307 11120 14500
Capital balance -4678 -5229 -5982 -7382 -10034 -13209
OveralL balance _b/ 23 1198 2770 1900 1020 -2418
Financing
Domestic 123 -1209 -2058 -1300 -692 2519
Foreign -146 11 -712 -600 -328 -101
a/ Budget.
.b/ Including net lending.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.11: Monetary Survey
(end of year)
.. ......... .................. 
... .... ... .... ... .... .... .................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991




Net foreign assets 
-6127 -1605 7251 9104 10140 8075
Assets 8333 8647 14901 16155 18041 19230
Liabilities 14460 10252 7650 7051 7901 11155
Domestic credit 49496 57041 64099 79089 96888 118186
Public sector 5915 7854 6761 8825 10233 11898
Private sector -a/ 43581 49187 57338 70264 86655 106288
Broad money (M2) 33833 40280 48939 58638 68708 83746
Narrow money (Ml) 8809 10107 12151 14329 15905 21752
Quasi-money 25024 30173 36788 44309 52803 61994
(Rate of change, X)
Net foreign assets 
-- -- -- -- - -
Assets 3.7 3.8 72.3 8.4 11.7 6.6
LiabIities 
-8.6 -29.1 -25.4 -7.8 12.1 41.2
Domestic credit 16.3 15.2 12.4 23.4 22.5 22.0
Public sector 193.8 32.8 -13.9 30.5 16.0 16.3
Private sector 7.5 12.9 16.6 22.5 23.3 22.7
Broad money (M2) 18.4 19.1 21.5 19.8 17.2 21.9
Narrow money (Ml) 13.5 14.7 20.2 17.9 11.0 36.8
Quasi-money 20.3 20.6 21.9 20.4 19.2 17.4
_a/ Including the claims on official entities and non-bank financial institutions
until 1985.
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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TWb*e A.12: Wages, Prices, and Productivity
(Manufacturing, 1985=100)
........ .................................................................................
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Wages
Index 109.2 121.9 145.8 182.4 219.1 256.1
Rate of change (X) 9.2 11.6 19.6 25.1 20.2 16.9
Prices (WPI)
Index 98.5 99.0 101.7 103.2 107.5 113.3
Rate of change (X) -1.5 0.5 2.7 1.5 4.2 5.4
Prices (CPI)
Index 102.8 105.9 113.4 119.9 130.2 142.8
Rate of change CX) 2.8 3.0 7.1 5.7 8.6 9.7
Productivity
Index 118.0 132.6 148.9 159.1 181.9 203.6
Rate of change (X) 18.0 12.4 12.3 6.9 14.3 11.9
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1992; Korea Productivity Center;
Mfinistry of Labor.
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Table A.13: Industrial Production
(1985.100)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.................................... . . .... . .. . .... . .. . .... . .. . .... . .. .................. ..... .......... 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
~~~~~~~~. . . ....... ........... ............................... ... .... ...............
ALL itbin
Index 121.0 144.2 163.3 168.5 183.5 199.3
Rate of change tX) 21.0 19.2 13.2 3.2 8.9 8.6
Mining
Index 107.2 108.5 107.8 97.0 87.0 86.1
Rate of change tX) 7.2 1.2 -0.6 -10.0 10.3 -1.0
Manufacturing
Index 122.1 146.6 166.3 171.3 186.5 202.6
Rate of change CX) 22.1 20.1 13.4 3.0 8.9 8.6
Electricity
index 111.5 127.6 147.3 162.9 185.6 204.5
Rate of change tX) 11.5 14.4 15.4 10.6 13.9 10.2
.........................................................................................
Source: Bank of Korea, Economnic Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
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Table A.14: Diat'ioxut1on of Income by income DeciLe
Income Decile WhoLe country Urban RuraL
1980 1985 1988 1980 1985 1988 1980 1985 1988
........................ I.............................................................................................
First 1.57 2.59 2.81 1.46 2.26 2.80 1.76 3.18 2.93
Second 3.52 4.37 4.58 3.31 4.05 4.46 3.88 4.91 4.99
Third 4.86 5.48 5.65 4.65 5.21 5.47 5.29 6.04 6.19
Fourth 6.11 6.47 6.64 5.87 6.16 6.39 6.55 7.05 7.28
Fifth 7.33 7.57 7.60 7.12 7.25 7.35 7.83 8.12 8.38
Sixth 8.63 8.73 8.67 8.40 8.48 8.43 9.13 9.32 9.47
Seventh 10.21 10.10 10.01 10.07 9.92 9.79 10.66 10.55 10.74
Eighth 12.38 11.97 11.80 ;2.23 11.94 11.64 12.71 12.28 12.47
Ninth 15.93 15.10 14.62 16.09 15.33 14.58 15.98 14.96 14.99
Tenth 29.46 27.62 27.62 30.80 29.40 29.09 26.21 23.59 22.56
Gini
coefficient 0.389 0.345 0.336 0.405 0.369 0.350 0.356 0.297 0.290
Source: Economic Planning Board.
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